United Nations S/2013/514

Security Council

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Letter dated 28 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to express my deep concerns about the biased report on the situation in the Middle East delivered on 20 August 2013 by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the Security Council.

One would think that a report on the situation in the Middle East would focus on the humanitarian crisis that has besieged Syria for the past two and a half years. Over 100,000 men, women, and children have been slaughtered and millions have fled their homes. At the time of the Assistant Secretary-General's August report, the regime stood accused of using chemical weapons on its citizens. Despite all this, just a few paragraphs of the report were devoted to the chaos in Syria.

Turmoil and unrest are rampant from Tehran to Tunis, but the vast majority of the Middle East report centred on Israel and the Palestinians. Rather than hearing about the facts on the ground, the Security Council heard a report that leaves a lot to be desired. Specifically:

- In his report, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs stated that, "The calm in Gaza has been tentative, with six projectiles shot at Israel". One needs the eloquence of Shakespeare to describe a barrage of rockets and mortar shells intended to kill innocent civilians as "projectiles". The choice of language projects more about the author than the situation in Israel's south.

- The section on Gaza also noted that, "... the long-standing restrictions on the free movement of people and goods via Israel ... [has resulted] in shortages in key medical supplies". In truth, Israel does not place restrictions on medical supplies entering Gaza. Furthermore, since 23 July 2013, 23 tons of medical equipment entered Gaza via Kerem Shalom crossing. This is in addition to 418 tons of goods that passed from Israel into Gaza during the same period. It would seem that the only shortage to speak of is the shortage of accurate information in the monthly reports.

- The report described that "[there] appears to be a significant increase in demolitions in East Jerusalem during the reporting period". It would appear that this report has been constructed on half-truths, using omissions to denounce demolitions. The report curiously neglects to note that following a judicial review, the buildings in question were found to be illegally constructed.

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- With regard to Lebanon, the report stated, "Determination is pending as to whether any other violation, such as the presence of unauthorized weapons or armed personnel, was involved". While the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs had no misgivings about aiming allegations directly at Israel Defense Forces (IDF) activities, he was unwilling to explicitly condemn the terrorist group Hizbullah for intentionally planting explosive devices. He also conveniently neglected to report that Hizbullah is operating within civilian populations and directing attacks against civilian populations. Hizbullah is committing a double war crime, making it doubly disturbing that it was absent from the report.

- With regard to Syria, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs wrote that, "Israel Defense Forces fired at least two guided missiles from the Alpha side across the ceasefire line, in response to earlier fire from the Bravo side that crossed the ceasefire line". I cannot say bravo to the Assistant Secretary-General for not being more explicit about events on the Bravo side. As mortar shells fell inside Israel, the IDF issued repeated warnings. After the third mortar fell, the IDF fired a warning shot.

- Reading the Assistant Secretary-General's report, one would need a strong pair of binoculars to zoom in on significant developments in the region. While the Assistant Secretary-General chose to report that three Palestinians had attempted to swim towards Israel, many far more important events were omitted. For example, Israel's painful decision to release convicted murderers to advance peace negotiations received only a passing mention. Additionally, while the report noted concerns with the well-being of Palestinian prisoners, it failed to mention that these are convicted murderers who are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Israeli men, women and children.

Finally, during the reporting period, there were a number of attacks aimed at Israelis that were not reported to the Council. In the West Bank, attacks by Palestinians injured 13 IDF soldiers and 5 Israeli citizens.

The 20 August 2013 report painted a blatantly distorted picture of the reality in our region. I urge the Council to insist that future reports clarify the situation in the Middle East.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Note by the President of the Security Council

1. In 2010, the Security Council committed itself to implementing a number of measures to enhance its efficiency and transparency, in addition to its interaction and dialogue with non-Council members and bodies, through a note by the President of the Council of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507). The Council has considered valuable suggestions made by Member States on how to continue to improve dialogue with non-Council members and bodies. The present note builds on the provisions of the aforementioned note by the President, in addition to other such notes, and aims at complementing them.

2. The members of the Security Council are committed:

(a) To making more effective use, as appropriate, of public meetings, informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings;

(b) To bearing in mind the importance of informally consulting in an early manner, as provided for in the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507, para. 43);

(c) To remaining committed to maintaining regular communication with the Peacebuilding Commission. The Chair of the Commission and the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Commission will be invited, as appropriate, to participate in formal Council meetings. The members of the Council encourage, in addition, informal exchanges with the Chair of the Commission and the Chairs of the country-specific configurations, as appropriate, through informal interactive dialogues;

(d) To encouraging the subsidiary bodies to enhance the transparency of their activities, including by providing non-members of the Council with substantive interactive briefings, as agreed by their members, recognizing that doing so can add value to the work of those bodies;

(e) To encouraging the subsidiary bodies to consider any other opportunities for non-Council members to provide input to their work;

(f) Building on already agreed measures, to continuing to improve consultations with troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries, in recognition of the importance of such consultations;

(g) To continuing to expand consultation and cooperation, as appropriate, with relevant regional and subregional organizations, as agreed by the Council in the presidential statement of 13 January 2010 (S/PRST/2010/1), the presidential

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statement of 6 August 2013 (S/PRST/2013/12) and the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507), in addition to subsequent related documents and notes by the President;

(h) To continuing to provide opportunities to hear the views of the broader membership on the working methods of the Council, including in any open debate on the implementation of the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507), and to welcoming the continued participation by the broader membership in such debates;

(i) To considering the methodology of wrap-up sessions and informal briefing sessions, recognizing that those sessions can be organized by the President of the Council, as referred to in the note by the President of 12 December 2012 (S/2012/922);

(j) To continuing to keep the Council's working methods under consideration with a view to ensuring their effective and consistent implementation.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2095 (2013) of 14 March 2013. It covers major political and security developments, provides an overview of the humanitarian and human rights situation and outlines the activities of UNSMIL since the issuance of my report of 21 February 2013 (S/2013/104).

Political and security-related developments

2. During the reporting period, already significant political polarization was accentuated and manifested, inter alia, in the prolonged and divisive debate on the Political and Administrative Isolation Law, which seeks to bar officials from the previous regime from participation in public life. Along with the political and security fallout it created, disagreement remains strong over the future of the revolutionary brigades and illustrated controversies around the functioning of political institutions. For its part, the role of political parties is increasingly questioned and, in some cases, discredited.

3. Conflicting interests and views of political and regional forces in the country reflected in the General National Congress may have compromised its effectiveness as a legislative body and its standing in the eyes of many Libyans. This has had an undeniable impact on the stability of the political process and has hindered the Government in its ability to address the main problems facing the country.

4. The debate over the proposed law on political and administrative isolation dominated much of the political scene during the reporting period. Public support grew steadily for the exclusion from the political process and government bureaucracy of senior former regime officials, corrupt figures and others who had committed major human rights violations.

5. As deliberations became increasingly divisive within the General National Congress with regard to the scope of the proposed isolation law, a series of security incidents unfolded in which various political groups and armed elements stepped up their pressure on the authorities to adopt the law. Among these were the siege on the General National Congress on 5 March, forcing the legislative body to temporarily suspend its activities; an armed attack the same day on a vehicle carrying the then-President of the General National Congress, Mohammed El-Magariaf; assaults on a

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number of media outlets for their perceived bias against the law; and, most significantly, a two-week siege which began on 28 April by revolutionary brigades of several government ministries, including foreign affairs, interior and justice.

6. A majority vote in the General National Congress on 9 April resulted in the amendment of article 6 of the Constitutional Declaration, effectively protecting legislation on political isolation from legal challenge and thus paving the way for the eventual passage of the law. In its original form, the article had guaranteed citizens' equality before the law, which would have potentially disqualified the proposed law.

7. On 5 May, the General National Congress voted for the Political and Administrative Isolation Law by an overwhelming majority. The law, which is applicable for 10 years, lists a wide range of political, administrative and other positions, as well as types of affiliation and conduct, as a basis for the exclusion of individuals from public life. Proposals that the law include provisions for exempting persons on the basis of their early support for the Libyan revolution were rejected. Prior to the adoption of the law, UNSMIL advised the General National Congress on international standards and best practices for the vetting of State institutions, as well as on the potential consequences of exclusionary measures. In a memorandum presented to the General National Congress President, UNSMIL indicated clearly that some of the criteria for the proposed law are disproportionate, and at times vague, and could violate the civil and political rights of many citizens.

8. A commission has been formed to implement the law in all cases except those involving the judiciary. A number of challenges to the constitutionality of the law have since been submitted, including one by Libya's National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights.

9. Despite a distinguished record in active opposition to the Qadhafi-regime over three decades, Mohammed El-Magariaf chose to resign from his post as President of the General National Congress on 28 May in anticipation of the application of the law to him. First Vice-President Juma Attiga followed suit on 16 July. Nouri Abu-Sahmain has since replaced Mr. El-Magariaf as President, following a vote by the General National Congress on 25 June.

10. In response to calls from within the General National Congress and elsewhere for the formation of an emergency Cabinet, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced on 31 July that he would make new ministerial appointments and set up a crisis committee within the Cabinet. Deputy Prime Minister Awad al-Barasi resigned on 1 August, charging that government decision-making was overcentralized. A number of other ministers had resigned earlier in anticipation of being disbarred under the Political and Administrative Isolation Law.

11. The political fallout of the Political and Administrative Isolation Law deepened on 4 July, with the decision of the Coalition of National Forces to suspend the participation of its members in the General National Congress, except for the discussion and adoption of the electoral law for the Constitution Drafting Assembly. The bloc's leaders cited intimidation by armed groups with respect to the adoption of the isolation law as grounds for their boycott. The Coalition of National Forces also urged agreement on a future road map, given that delays in adopting the electoral law for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly meant that the current timelines specified for the transitional period would extend beyond the mandate of

the General National Congress, which ends in February 2014. Although the Coalition later rescinded its boycott, it announced on 1 August that it was suspending its participation in the political process until a Constitution was in place, and leaving it to individual members to decide whether to continue sitting in the Congress. Separately, leaders of the Justice and Construction Party initially declared on 5 July that it would cease to operate as a political party within both the General National Congress and the Government, and that its legislators and ministers would function as independents; the decision was later reversed, following opposition from the party's Supreme Council.

12. Throughout the political crisis that ensued over the debate and subsequent adoption of the Political and Administrative Isolation Law, my Special Representative, Tarek Mitri, and his team stepped up engagement with all parties concerned, underlining the need for dialogue to defuse tensions and ensure respect for the democratic process.

Constitution-drafting process

13. Efforts aimed at starting the constitutional process remained a political priority throughout the reporting period. The General National Congress in February resolved the long-standing dispute over the manner in which members of the Constitution Drafting Assembly would be selected. It opted for the election of a 60-member body with equal representation from the three historical regions of Libya. To this effect, it had to adopt a new amendment to the Constitutional Declaration, following a ruling of the Supreme Court. On 16 July the General National Congress approved an electoral law, with a majoritarian system and single seat constituencies. Six seats were reserved for women and another six for the three minority communities: the Amazigh, the Tuareg and the Tabu.

14. Groups representing the three communities objected to the law on the grounds that it failed to adequately uphold their rights. They launched a campaign of civil disobedience in protest on 24 July, including a boycott of the General National Congress. On 30 July, Congress passed a law recognizing the Amazigh, Tuareg and Tabu languages and providing for them to be taught in schools. Although community leaders welcomed the move, and Tuareg legislators ended their boycott, they continued to demand constitutional safeguards.

15. The United Nations remained actively engaged in supporting civic education and public outreach on constitutional issues in an effort to help the Libyan people prepare to participate in the constitution-drafting process. UNSMIL chairs a constitutional support working group that serves as the primary coordination and information-sharing mechanism for international partners working on the issue. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organized a number of training workshops on constitutional processes, and is giving support to a national outreach campaign by a civil society organization; in collaboration with the United Nations Electoral Support Team, UNDP also trained women's rights advocates on the electoral elements of the constitutional process. Working with the European Union and the University of Benghazi, UNDP also supported a nationwide survey of public views on the Constitution.

Decentralization

16. On 1 June, the Transitional Council of Barqa, which brings together pro-federalists in the east, unilaterally declared eastern Libya a federal region. The Council claimed the move was necessary in the light of the central Government's failure to address the political, security and socioeconomic needs of eastern Libya, and stated that it would work towards establishing its own governance structures. Surveys indicate that public support for federalism is low. However, there remains a broad consensus on the need for the decentralization of government services, the generation of employment opportunities and heightened investment in infrastructure throughout the region. In a move designed to reaffirm its commitment to address these legitimate concerns, the Government announced on 5 June that it would re-establish in due course the headquarters of the National Oil Company and a number of other State institutions in Benghazi.

Internally displaced communities

17. A decision by leaders of the displaced Tawergha community to announce their return to their hometown of the same name highlighted the plight of the community resulting from their forced displacement, and the harsh living conditions they continue to endure. My Special Representative witnessed this first-hand during a visit to a displacement camp in Tripoli on 3 June 2013. Given allegations of human rights violations in Misrata by Tawerghan community members in 2011, their unilateral return, in the absence of an agreement to address these violations through appropriate justice mechanisms, was deemed fraught with risks. Following intense mediation efforts in the lead up to the 25 June deadline set by the Tawerghans, and a public commitment by the Government to develop a plan for their return and improve their living conditions, the Tawergha Local Council agreed in June to postpone the return.

18. Meanwhile, the bodies of 11 people were exhumed in May from a grave in Tawergha. The identification process proceeded amid political controversy over their identity and cause of death. UNSMIL proposed that the Government create a fact-finding mechanism, within the context of an integrated transitional justice strategy, to address both the grievances of the inhabitants of Misrata against Tawerghans during the revolution and the grievances of displaced Tawerghans following the revolution.

19. Intermittent clashes between the Mashashiya and Guntrar tribes in March and April resulted in the displacement of an estimated 3,000 residents from Mizdah, predominantly Mashashiyans. They have since returned to their homes following a ceasefire agreement between representatives of the two tribes.

Security situation in Tripoli

20. Following a series of incidents involving kidnapping, armed robberies and other criminal activity, the General National Congress adopted on 20 March Decision 27, instructing the Ministries of Defence and the Interior to remove from the capital all "illegitimate armed formations", and ensure transfer to the army of all illegal arms and military equipment in the city. Notwithstanding broad public support for the decision, its implementation has proven to be quite difficult, partly owing to the conflicting political and regional agendas on the part of the various brigades.

21. As tensions grew between rival revolutionary units in Tripoli, major clashes erupted on 26 June between Zintan brigades affiliated with the Ministry of Defence and others affiliated with Tripoli's Supreme Security Committee. The two-day clashes left at least 10 dead, and on 27 June, the Minister of Defence, Mohammad al-Bargathi, was dismissed. The restoration of a fragile calm to the city's streets was interrupted by the remote detonation of four car bombs on 16 July.

22. A tribal gathering in Zintan issued a statement strongly criticizing the General National Congress, the Government and political parties for the continued failure to build an effective army and police force. On the opposing side, a number of local councils convened in Tripoli and condemned the actions of those military groups which they perceived as threatening the capital's peace and stability. Amid objections from a number of General National Congress members, on 27 July General National Congress President Abu Sahmain assigned a coalition of revolutionary brigades the task of protecting Tripoli, citing the inability of the army and the police to do so. Following a decision by the General National Congress on 5 August authorizing the President to take urgent measures to uphold security in all parts of the country, Libya Shield units from the central and western parts of the country began deploying in Tripoli on 8 August as part of an emergency plan to secure the city.

Eastern Libya

23. Benghazi and other parts of eastern Libya witnessed mounting opposition to the revolutionary brigades, particularly those formations referred to as Libya Shields, which are comprised largely of revolutionary units falling under the operational control of the Chief of General Staff of the Libyan army. Political differences regarding their long-term status precipitated a fatal clash on 8 June, when a demonstration outside the barracks of one such Libya Shield brigade deteriorated into an exchange of fire between brigade members and protestors, as a result of which some 30 people were killed.

24. Responding swiftly to the violence in Benghazi, on 9 June the General National Congress passed Decision 53, in which it called on the Prime Minister to present a proposal for the integration of armed brigades into the military and on the judiciary to conduct an investigation into the incident. In the wake of that decision, the General National Congress accepted the resignation of the Chief of General Staff of the Army. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Defence called on military units in Benghazi to assume control of the barracks belonging to the four Libya Shield components stationed in the city. Although the deployment of Special Forces units from the military throughout Benghazi was welcomed by the city's population, and appeared to go some way towards meeting their demand for the army to be deployed, the move did not fully address the central issue of the Libya Shield brigades and their future.

25. In what appeared to be a related incident, on 15 June unidentified armed elements attacked the police force at the National Security Directorate in Benghazi. They subsequently engaged nearby military units, including from the Special Forces, leading to the death of several soldiers.

26. The tense security situation in Benghazi continued to evolve amid a discernible campaign of assassinations targeting members of the security forces in eastern Libya. Several current and former security officials were killed in Benghazi and Derna by unidentified elements. Similarly, police installations in Benghazi and Derna continued to come under attack.

27. The assassination on 26 July of prominent activist Abdelsalam al-Mesmari, the highest-profile political killing since the revolution, triggered a wave of protest demonstrations in Benghazi, Tripoli and other cities, in a number of cases accompanied by attacks on the offices of political parties.

Southern Libya

28. The security situation in the south remained mostly fragile despite efforts by the Government to assume greater control over its southern border areas and smuggling routes. The reporting period witnessed a spate of security incidents, including armed attacks on 30 March on the security directorate in Sabha and a military base in the region; and three car bombs in downtown Sabha on 26 June, resulting in four deaths and many others wounded.

29. The population in the south has expressed fears, based on unverified information or unconfirmed reports, regarding the infiltration into the south of members of extremist armed groups coming from, or through, neighbouring countries. To be sure, the south is not immune to the impact of the military intervention in Mali, which has resulted in, among other things, an influx of displaced persons. Clearly, the insecurity of Libya's borders is a regional issue that requires concerted efforts and international support.

30. In a move designed to improve tribal relations and promote peace and stability in the Sabha area, Awlad Suleiman and some Tabu tribal leaders signed on 20 April a reconciliation pact, viewed as controversial by some, in the presence of senior government officials. Residents in Sabha continue, however, to demand additional measures to help promote reconciliation in the region.

31. In response to fighting in early March in Kufra, primarily between the Zwaya and Tabu tribes, the General National Congress called on 26 March for the deployment of mixed government forces to assume control of checkpoints held by revolutionary brigades. Notwithstanding improvement in security in Kufra since clashes there in 2012, there has been little sustainable progress towards resolving long-standing grievances linked to local representation and service delivery, citizenship and identity card issues, illegal migration and tribal reconciliation between the Zwaya and Tabu communities.

II. Activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

A. Electoral support

32. Following the 9 April decision of the General National Congress stipulating that the 60-member constitutional drafting assembly should be elected, an 18-member electoral committee was appointed with the task of presenting a draft electoral law.

33. After weeks of lengthy deliberations by the General National Congress plenary, the electoral law was finally passed on 16 July. My Special Representative had presented the leadership of the General National Congress with written commentary on the draft proposals for consideration by Congress members. A public statement was also issued by UNSMIL calling on the General National Congress to ensure the active participation of women in the constitution-drafting process, and urging the inclusion of special measures for women in the electoral law.

34. On 28 March, the General National Congress passed a revised law on electoral administration establishing the High National Election Commission as a permanent institution. The seven members of Board of Commissioners of the Commission, including one woman, were subsequently appointed on 21 April.

35. Amendments introduced in March by the General National Congress to Law No. 59/2012 on local administration provided a framework for local elections. In April, the Government issued a decision on rules and regulations regarding municipal council elections and appointed a central committee to oversee them, under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Governance, which has since approached UNDP with a request to assist the committee. Consequently, an electoral needs assessment mission was conducted in June to define the support that the United Nations will provide to the process.

36. During the reporting period, the United Nations Electoral Support Team focused on three major areas of assistance, including the provision of advice on the drafting of electoral legislation, support to the High National Election Commission and the promotion of electoral awareness and knowledge, particularly on issues of voter registration, electoral systems and promotion of gender equality in the electoral process.

37. The United Nations Electoral Support Team continued to work closely with the High National Election Commission, providing it with technical assistance on internal reorganization and capacity-building in the different areas of electoral administration. Further support is being provided to enable the Commission to commence operational planning for elections to the constitutional drafting assembly now that the requisite electoral legislation has been passed.

B. Human rights, transitional justice and rule of law

Detentions

38. The situation of conflict-related detentions has remained largely unchanged from my report of 21 February 2013, with the overall number of detainees estimated to be around 8,000, the majority of whom are held in facilities nominally under the authority of the Ministries of Justice or Defence. There was no significant advancement in the judicial screening of detainees, partly because of the limited enforcement power of the prosecutors and their reluctance to act for fear of reprisal. The safety of judicial personnel remained a serious concern, with several attacks on prosecutors and judges recorded, including the assassination of a high-level judge outside the courthouse in Derna on 16 June and bomb attacks on courthouses in Sirte and Benghazi on 24 and 28 July, respectively.

39. UNSMIL continued to advise the Government in support of its efforts to assert its authority over all detainees, provide further training to prosecutors and advise on the formulation of an overall prosecutorial strategy to deal with conflict-related detentions.

40. The treatment of detainees remains of serious concern, with evidence of continuing torture and other forms of ill-treatment, especially in a number of detention facilities. Since January 2013, UNSMIL has gathered evidence, including medical reports, suggesting that at least 10 deaths in custody were due to torture. No one has been held to account to date.

41. Conditions of detentions in a number of facilities, especially those holding illegal migrants under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, remain largely unacceptable. The Ministry of Justice made significant efforts to improve conditions at several facilities, including in Zliten, where UNSMIL observed improvements, particularly in the medical care of detainees.

42. On 9 April, the General National Congress adopted a law criminalizing torture, enforced disappearances and discrimination. The law is likely to have a deterrent effect on grave abuses of human rights. It will contribute to ending impunity for the perpetrators of such abuses.

Trials of former senior regime officials

43. Trials of senior figures from the Qadhafi regime included trial sessions in Tripoli of former Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi on charges related to incitement to kill and corruption, and of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi in Zintan on charges relating to his alleged escape attempt during the visit from officials of the International Criminal Court in 2012. Two other former Qadhafi officials on trial in connection with the Lockerbie compensations were acquitted in Tripoli on 17 June. On 31 July, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Qadhafi, a former Education Minister, was sentenced to death along with five others by a court in Misrata.

44. On 31 May, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court rejected the admissibility challenge by Libya in the case of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi. On 18 July, the Appeals Chamber rejected Libya's request to further suspend the order to surrender Mr. Qadhafi to the Court, recalling the obligation of Libya to effect such surrender, but the appeal on admissibility remained pending. Libya filed an admissibility challenge in the case against Abdullah al-Senussi on 2 April and the Pre-Trial Chamber granted a postponement of the surrender of Mr. Al-Senussi to the Court, pending its decision on the admissibility challenge.

Judiciary and prisons

45. Except for senior members of the Qadhafi regime, the resumption of criminal trials remains slow, owing to security problems, while civil, commercial and administrative courts appear to be resuming operations at a faster pace. On 17 April, the General National Congress adopted a law abolishing the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians. This is a welcome step towards compliance with international standards on the role of the military criminal justice system.

46. Following the amendment by the General National Congress of the law on the status of the judiciary meant to enhance the independence of the judiciary by allowing for the election of the Supreme Judicial Council by their peers, the Council, under its new composition, elected a president through a secret ballot and is considering proposals for further judicial reform. A law establishing a specialized administrative justice order and a constitutional court is being prepared. The law is part of a reform process to increase the ability of citizens to challenge administrative decisions and laws. UNSMIL is assisting in this reform process.

47. Recurrent cases of prison breaks have underlined the existing capacity gaps. Shortage of equipment, to mention an example, affects the judicial police and Libya's prison service. Of particular concern were breakouts from the Sabha prison involving dozens of inmates in March and April. In June, also in Sabha, armed men

attacked the prison freeing some 50 to 60 prisoners and killing one of them in his cell. On 27 July, some 1,400 inmates escaped following a riot at the Kweifiya prison in Benghazi. Those escaped included 500 charged with murder and other serious crimes, as well as a number of conflict-related detainees. In Misrata, the building of a new State-run prison is still under way.

48. UNSMIL continued to provide advice and training to the judicial police, assisting also in its restructuring. Some 10,000 members from the revolutionary brigades are estimated to have been integrated into the judicial police service, including 4,000 in 2013, reaching its full absorption capacity. A preliminary vetting process has been put in place, based on criminal records.

Transitional justice

49. A draft transitional justice law remains pending before the General National Congress following repeated delays in its adoption. A national human rights conference in al-Baida, endorsed by the Government and attended by my Special Representative, called on 30 May for the adoption of the law, among other recommendations. The existing fact-finding and reconciliation commission set up in 2012 has been largely inactive. On 26 June, the General National Congress ordered the establishment of a committee to look into the 1996 massacre at Abu Salim prison. UNSMIL continued to urge the adoption of the transitional justice law, which would allow for the implementation of a comprehensive strategy.

C. Security sector

50. A well-defined government plan to rebuild and reform State security institutions has not yet been agreed upon, and nor duly approved by the Government or endorsed by the General National Congress. Engaging revolutionary and other armed formations continues to be urgently needed in order to lift many obstacles to addressing national security problems.

51. The adoption of Decision 53 by the General National Congress on 9 June represents an important step. The Decision calls on the Government to develop a security plan to integrate all "legitimate" armed groups into the State security forces and to disband all those deemed "illegitimate". The Government's ability to finalize and implement initiatives to train large numbers of military and security forces in Libya will determine, significantly, the implementation of security plans. The Government is presently discussing with a number of international partners the modalities of the training, while also putting in place the necessary mechanisms for absorbing trained recruits into the State military and security apparatus.

Security sector architecture and coordination

52. The Government took initial steps towards establishing national security coordination mechanisms to address security issues more effectively. In this respect, the Government established a committee for border affairs, and following promulgation of Decision 53, another committee for integration and reintegration of members of armed groups. In support of the Government efforts, UNSMIL continued to provide advisory and coordination assistance in these two areas. Progress in the execution of the security sector plans continues to be dependent, to some extent, on effective government implementation mechanism.

53. The three security-related General National Congress committees gradually moved forward in exercising oversight of the Government activities in the national security sector. To strengthen the performance of these committees, the General National Congress and UNSMIL developed a comprehensive support programme. In June, UNSMIL organized the first workshop on civilian oversight of the security sector for representatives from the three committees.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

54. The committee formed by the Prime Minister to look into the implementation of Decision 53 is expected to coordinate the efforts so far undertaken separately by the Ministries of Defence and Interior in integrating members of the revolutionary brigades and other armed groups into the armed forces and the police. At the request of the committee, UNSMIL is providing advice on different aspects of integration and reintegration.

55. A majority of members of armed groups has expressed the wish to be reintegrated into civilian life. The Warriors' Affairs Commission for Rehabilitation and Development, which is also represented on the committee, is focusing its efforts on creating employment, training and study opportunities, and has requested expertise from the international community in higher education programmes, vocational training and business development.

56. UNSMIL and the United Nations country team combined efforts to assist the Warriors' Affairs Commission for Rehabilitation and Development in the implementation of its reintegration projects. While the World Health Organization (WHO) continues to offer support services in the area of psychosocial care, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), supported by the office of the Resident Coordinator, continue to work towards an operational plan to offer assistance in the area of vocational training and higher education. International coordination meetings chaired by the Mission have provided a regular forum where international partners and Libyan government institutions meet to identify concrete support for requests from the Government in the wider area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Border security

57. The Libyan authorities continue to face difficulties putting in place effective mechanisms for managing and securing national borders. Problems that need to be addressed include poor inter-agency coordination, operational ineffectiveness, lack of infrastructure in the remote southern border areas, and insufficient cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries.

58. UNSMIL facilitated a workshop on implementing the priorities of Libya for border security and management on 22 and 23 April. The workshop brought together national bodies responsible for various border issues, border communities in Libya's southern region, civil society organizations and representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and the African Union and other bilateral partners. The workshop resulted in 37 recommendations, covering the main areas of decision-making, inter-agency coordination, roles and responsibilities, operational capability, training, equipment, facilities and funding. The recommendations promoted an integrated approach to border security and management, aiming at enhancing border security capabilities,

fostering socioeconomic development in the south and integrating the revolutionaries into formal border security arrangements. The workshop provided an opportunity for the recently launched civilian European Union Border Assistance Mission to establish relationships with various concerned parties. UNSMIL, IOM and the European Union Border Assistance Mission are working collaboratively on border issues, and the workshop assisted European Union Border Assistance Mission in the development of its 2013 action plan.

Arms and ammunition management

59. Unsecured and damaged ammunition, chemical weapons materiel, easily accessible arms, and explosive remnants of war continue to pose a considerable threat to national and regional security. Financial support is required to determine the exact scale of the risk and inform counter-proliferation efforts. Sustained engagement is needed to ensure the emergence of Libyan institutional governance structures in this sector.

60. UNSMIL, through the United Nations Mine Action Service, continued to work with the Libyan authorities on early institution-building in the areas of ammunition management, arms control and humanitarian mine action by assisting Libyan efforts to establish interministerial committees, normative frameworks and standards. To help strengthen the Libyan security structure and ensure Libya's compliance with the International Mine Action Standards, UNSMIL provided technical and operational support to the Ministries of Defence and Interior, coordinating trainings on ammunition management, chemical weapons disposal and explosive ordnance disposal, and on mechanical detection equipment.

61. Pursuing a coherent "One United Nations" response, UNSMIL and the United Nations country team advised Libyan partners on strategic plans to address the existing landmine and the problem of explosive remnants of war in the country. Through expertise of the United Nations Children's Fund, UNSMIL supported risk education initiatives with the Ministry of Education, which resulted in the incorporation of the topic of risk education into the national school curriculum and textbooks, as well as the training of 290 teachers. Further to risk education sessions targeting 185,000 persons, these efforts reached an estimated 360,000 children.

62. Further to its submission of a plan for the destruction of the remaining chemical weapons stock with a completion date of December 2016, Libya resumed operations in March. Since February, UNSMIL, through the United Nations Mine Action Service, cleared 561,818 explosive remnants of war and small arms ammunition items weighing a total of 132 metric tons, covering 1.55 square kilometres of economically viable land and military areas and facilitated Libyan-led local projects on the safe storage and control of arms and ammunition. Despite these achievements, without additional financial support, the presence of unexploded ordnance, unsecured ammunition and uncontrolled weapons systems will continue to pose a significant risk to the civilian population.

Defence sector reform

63. Though the security situation in Libya remains unstable, the process of rebuilding the State's defence institutions has started, albeit slowly, with a number of concrete developments during the reporting period. UNSMIL continues to

provide strategic advice and coordination of international efforts to help build solid foundations for a capable defence sector under civilian oversight.

64. On 21 April, the Minister of Defence established a committee to revise Libya's military judicial system and laws, a task that will be undertaken with technical support from UNSMIL. Significant progress has been made in revising the military service law.

65. In an effort to address a central demand by the revolutionaries regarding the need to vet security personnel who had served under the former regime, and following the adoption of the Political and Administrative Isolation Law, the Integrity and Army Reform Commission was activated on 13 June. This step is seen as necessary for ensuring acceptance from the revolutionary groups regarding the new security forces.

66. In April, UNSMIL, in joint collaboration with the Ministry of Defence, the Libyan Armed Forces and bilateral partners, finalized proposals for a defence white paper, which lays out the elements for a future Libyan defence strategy and immediate priorities. The proposals have since been widely adopted by the Libyan defence sector as a blueprint for moving forward.

67. Reducing the inverted pyramid of senior personnel left over from the Qadhafi era is seen as an important element of security sector reform. To this end, a proposal for pension reform and incentives for early retirement written by a Canadian expert with the participation and facilitation of UNSMIL was presented to the Minister of Defence and the army's Chief of General Staff for consideration.

Police reform

68. UNSMIL continued its support to the Ministry of the Interior in overseeing the integration process of revolutionaries through the Ministry's central committee for integration, offering technical advice on a range of issues, including the reintegration of those who do not wish to join the police or do not meet the police service criteria and conditions.

69. As part of the reintegration process, the Ministry of the Interior claims to have registered some 78,346 revolutionaries through to the end of July, drawn from the Supreme Security Committee, a structure originally created to bring a number of revolutionary brigades under the general, and sometimes nominal, supervision. These include 3,935 currently receiving training, and 17,331 who have since completed their training. The reintegration process faces difficulties that range from limited training capacity, lack of equipment and the absence of clear deployment and follow-up plans.

70. The Government of Libya has prioritized the reform and restructuring of the Ministry of the Interior, but the actual decision on reforming and restructuring the Ministry has yet to be taken. UNSMIL continued to provide strategic advisory support to the Ministry on initiating the reform and restructuring process. UNSMIL also supported efforts to build the operational and administrative policing capacity within the Ministry.

71. In an effort to promote community-oriented policing, UNSMIL held a number of pilot workshops in Tripoli on community-oriented policing concepts, providing police, local authorities, civil society organizations and community representatives

an opportunity to form closer working relations in order to enhance community security and safety.

72. In the area of gender mainstreaming, UNSMIL conducted a workshop on women and policing, which aimed at assessing the current status of female police officers in the Ministry of the Interior and addressing their role in policing operations.

D. Coordination of international assistance

73. Consistent with the roles and responsibilities reflected in the United Nations integrated strategic framework in Libya for 2013-2014, and pursuant to the United Nations country team strategic framework for 2013-2014, the United Nations country team finalized its operational plan, which outlines programmes agreed between the United Nations and the Government of Libya in accordance with Libyan national priorities and needs.

74. The Peacebuilding Fund has made available approximately $500,000 to enable the United Nations system in Libya to rapidly deploy the short-term, dedicated technical experts to which I referred in my report of 21 March 2012 (S/2012/129, para. 77), when I outlined the UNSMIL approach to supporting Libyan priorities.

75. At the request of Libyan counterparts, missions from non-resident United Nations agencies, including the World Food Programme and the International Labour Organization, visited the country to discuss support to relevant Libyan institutions, in particular the Ministries of Planning, Economy, Foreign Affairs, Industry and Labour.

76. Implementation of the security, justice and rule of law development plans agreed last February at the International Ministerial Conference on Support to Libya in the Areas of Security, Justice and Rule of Law convened in Paris has progressed slowly. A meeting on 8 June of Libya's international partners and Libyan government departments concluded with an agreement that working groups for technical implementation of these plans would be established under the oversight of a core coordination committee comprising relevant Libyan government departments and ministries, international partners, and UNSMIL as the lead international body for coordination of international support.

77. UNSMIL continues to convene sectoral working groups to ensure better coordination of international assistance to Libya. Most international partners participate actively in the work of these groups. Libyan ownership of the coordination process needs to be reaffirmed; a greater leadership role for Libyan counterparts, essential for efficient coordination, is persistently invited. UNSMIL continues to convene, support or participate in a range of coordination forums with a view to improving the coordination of international assistance to Libya.

E. Humanitarian situation

78. Efforts by the International Organization for Migration to provide support to communities severely affected during the 2011 armed conflict are ongoing, primarily through the implementation of psychosocial programmes across three newly established centres in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata.

79. Libya continues to witness high levels of migration. The slow progress of the Libyan authorities in establishing mechanisms to screen migrant flows has exacerbated protection concerns for those with special needs, including victims of trafficking, refugees and asylum seekers. In particular, individuals from sub-Saharan African countries continue to be subjected to prolonged detention, denial of legal presence and lack of access to the labour market. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that approximately 7,800 migrants and asylum seekers, predominantly from sub-Saharan Africa, reached Italy in the first half of 2013, with a further 600 having arrived to Malta.

80. As at the end of June 2013, some 24,400 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with UNHCR, including 11,502 Syrian refugees, 2,799 Eritreans, and 1,629 Somalis. Over a quarter of those registered have been assessed as vulnerable and in need of protection, and have received assistance from UNHCR.

81. The Government of Libya has agreed to provide Syrian refugees free access to health care and education. A national committee was established to register Syrian refugees and issue them with identity cards and work permits; UNHCR is providing the authorities with technical and material support to assist in this process. An estimated 25 per cent of the newly arrived refugees from Syria are in immediate need of assistance. UNHCR has deployed mobile teams throughout the country to register refugees from Syria, deliver relief items and facilitate access to education, medical and other services.

82. Along with United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, UNSMIL continued to work closely with local and international non-governmental organizations on preparedness to deal with potential humanitarian crises. UNSMIL also provided capacity support to the Office of the Prime Minister on issues related to internally displaced persons, including reconciliation efforts and humanitarian relief to vulnerable groups, and is working closely with the Libyan Humanitarian Relief Agency (LibAid), which acts as the national coordinator for humanitarian issues. Internal displacement remains a significant concern in Libya, with approximately 56,544 internally displaced persons registered in the country. While the number of internally displaced persons is fairly stable and the Government has the funds to support them, the return of internally displaced persons is closely tied to the success of a reconciliation process. The Government has established a Department for internally displaced persons affairs and has requested UNSMIL support to organize a national conference on internal displacement in Libya to help with the return of internally displaced persons.

III. Deployment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

83. As at 30 June, a total of 215 UNSMIL international staff, Government-provided personnel and national staff members had been deployed, comprising 191 in Tripoli, 3 in Benghazi, 4 in Sabha, 3 at United Nations Headquarters and 14 at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy.

IV. Safety and security

84. The bombing of the French embassy in Tripoli in April, the targeting of an Italian diplomatic vehicle in June, and the firing of a rocket-propelled grenade at the United Arab Emirates embassy in July count among the most serious incidents involving the international diplomatic community since the attack on the United States Government facilities in Benghazi in September 2012. The overall deterioration of the security situation in the country, and the continued lack of effective host government protection for the United Nations, necessitated a number of mitigating arrangements and called for further measures indispensable for ensuring the continuation of United Nations operations and programmes.

85. In June, United Nations staff members in Sabha were temporarily relocated to Tripoli after armed clashes erupted between rival tribes and the closure of the city airport.

V. Implementation of mission concept

86. In my report of 1 March 2012, I explained that the UNSMIL mission concept would have at its core the attributes of flexibility and responsiveness, driven by needs on the ground and the normative responsibilities of the United Nations. Although it has not been easy to identify and recruit individuals with the necessary specialist skills in areas such as security sector reform and the constitution-making process for work in Libya, the Mission is now equipped with a small core of relatively senior advisers across all mandate areas.

87. In the effort to recruit the necessary specialist expertise, the Mission has issued 36 post-specific job openings, and ultimately rostered 114 candidates; 20 of the 31 candidates recruited from these post-specific job openings are Arabic speakers. Outreach is a challenge, and the difficulty in recruiting staff fluent in both Arabic and English results in heavy reliance on international and national translators and interpreters.

88. UNSMIL has made a concerted effort to recruit and build the capacity of national professionals, and has to date filled 68 out of 113 national General Service and Professional posts with highly qualified Libyan staff, including 19 women. As at 1 August, women represented 40 per cent of national professionals, 34 per cent of international professionals and 31 per cent of the leadership posts (P5-Special Representative of the Secretary-General), and 26 per cent of field service staff. Unfortunately, international female staff constituted 43 per cent of those departing the mission between January 2012 and 1 August 2013.

VI. Financial aspects

89. By its resolution 66/263, the General Assembly approved the amount of $36,039,100 for UNSMIL for the period 1 January to 31 December 2012. By its resolution 67/246, the Assembly approved an additional amount of $50,637,200 for the period up to December 2013, bringing the total resources for UNSMIL for the biennium 2012-2013 to $86,676,300.

VII. Observations and recommendations

90. To safeguard the democratic transition of Libya and enable it to foster genuine progress, it is vital that all political forces demonstrate respect for the elected legitimate political institutions and adherence to the norms that govern their functioning. The centrality of the role of the General National Congress, as the main legislative institution, needs to be affirmed.

91. The considerable political polarization during the reporting period and the risks it carries in a context marked by precariousness and increasing insecurity should not be underestimated. The divisiveness that characterized the debate over the Political and Administrative Isolation Law, and the process leading to its adoption, is a strong reminder of the heavy legacy bequeathed to the Libyan people after decades of brutal authoritarian rule and the difficult consensus-building on a long-term national healing process. The controversy surrounding the law did not end with its adoption. There have been challenges to its constitutionality and warnings that its implementation may exacerbate tensions. It is therefore worth emphasizing the importance of measures regarding the law that will ensure proportionality, fairness, transparency and the safeguarding of civil and political rights in accordance with international human rights and legal standards.

92. The long-overdue adoption of the electoral law for the Constitution Drafting Assembly is expected to accelerate the process of constitution-making and create new political dynamics in the country. The United Nations will continue to work closely with the High National Election Commission, providing it with the support that it needs to ensure the success of the elections.

93. As the constitutional process begins to unfold, I wish to underline the importance of ensuring inclusion and attention to the legitimate aspirations of all segments of Libyan society, including women, minorities and young people. Crucial to the credibility of this process is maintaining a safe and secure environment, free from violence and armed intimidation. The United Nations stands actively ready and committed to provide the support necessary for the success of the constitution-making process.

94. I remain deeply concerned at the slow and insufficient progress in the transfer of detainees from the custody of armed brigades to the State. A few thousand detainees remain only nominally under the authority of relevant ministries, and thousands of others continue to be held by armed brigades not affiliated with the State in any form. The continuing ill-treatment and torture in non-State-run detention facilities is unacceptable. I take this opportunity to strongly remind all parties concerned of their duties and obligations to abide by their responsibilities under international humanitarian and human rights law and to cooperate with the Libyan Government in order to speed up the handover of all detainees to the custody of State institutions and set in motion due judicial processes.

95. I am concerned that the process of transitional justice remains almost stalled, with a draft law on transitional justice yet to be adopted by the General National Congress. Along with comprehensive and impartial truth-seeking initiatives, the law on transitional justice is essential for the facilitation of national reconciliation and the critical healing process. A proper legal framework is also needed to address the issue of missing persons and those forcibly disappeared, as is an overall policy on reparations. I therefore urge the Libyan authorities to adopt the legislation on

transitional justice, and to address these issues in an integrated way as a matter of urgency.

96. The reform of the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council constitutes a significant step towards enshrining the independence of the judiciary. An independent, impartial and professional judiciary is a safeguard for screening those held without charge or trial, and for the trials of senior members of the former regime. The volatile security situation continues to pose an obstacle to the establishment of a fully functioning judicial system. I remain conscious of the scope of the difficulties faced by Libyan judges and prosecutors in seeking to ensure that justice is served. I recommend that the Government adopt a security plan, with the involvement of all ministries concerned, to allow an accelerated resumption of court services across the country.

97. Next month will mark two years since the historic declaration of liberation was made following the cessation of armed conflict in Libya. However, for the transition period to be ultimately meaningful to all Libyan citizens, they need to see tangible improvements in their daily lives, in particular in the delivery of basic services at the local level, including in the areas of public health, education, housing and infrastructure, as well as in the creation of new employment opportunities. I therefore call on the Libyan Government and authorities to give urgent priority to making progress on this front and to make use of the international expertise and assistance that the United Nations, along with partners in the international community, have expressly committed to provide to Libya.

98. I commend the Government of Libya for its intensified efforts towards reforming the security institutions. It cannot be denied that this is an undertaking fraught with difficulties. However, the vision for integrating revolutionaries into the military and security forces or back into civilian life should find expression in a number of concrete decisions and relevant implementation mechanisms. A new national defence act and the reform of conditions of service in the military, in particular salary and pension reform, will undoubtedly constitute a positive step forward.

99. Despite the progress achieved in addressing border security issues, establishing effective control over the vast borders of Libya will take time and require considerable resources. However, given the regional dimension of border security, making tangible and sustainable progress in this regard is unrealistic without the cooperation of Libya's neighbours. The political support and technical expertise of the international community is fundamental in order to address the challenges related to transnational organized crime, terrorism, illegal migration, drugs and arms smuggling, all of which continue to pose a serious danger to the region's stability. I call on all concerned Governments to work collaboratively towards building meaningful partnerships and to lay the ground for the building of serious and viable border security mechanisms.

100. The continuing volatile security situation in Libya in general, and in the eastern and southern parts of the country in particular, is a source of grave concern. Targeted political assassinations, criminal activity and attacks and threats against the diplomatic community continue to plague the country, including Tripoli. The protection of the civilian population and the enforcement of law need to be reaffirmed as a national priority.

101. The status of the revolutionary brigades, and their relationship with the State, remains a matter of considerable contention and instability within Libyan society. Reaching consensus on their future in Libya's evolving security architecture is an issue of paramount importance. I welcome, in this regard, the reaffirmation by the Libyan authorities of the urgency of this endeavour. The United Nations will continue to offer its support as required by the Libyan authorities.

102. Notwithstanding the political and security developments in Libya since my previous report, I take due note of the widespread agreement on the need for an inclusive dialogue process, meant to seek consensus on national priorities, guidelines for the transitional process and norms of political action. Such dialogue is a prerequisite for the development of a broad-based peace and reconciliation process. I therefore call on the Libyan authorities to initiate, as a matter of urgency, a meaningful and comprehensive dialogue that would engage all political, revolutionary and social actors, in order to enhance national concord as the basis of viable and sustainable progress in the country's transition. Through the good offices of my Special Representative, UNSMIL will continue to encourage and assist this process.

103. In closing, I reiterate the commitment of the United Nations to fully supporting the Libyan people in their democratic transition. I commend the Libyan authorities and people for their accomplishments to date and I thank them for their close cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations. I also thank all international partners, regional organizations and others who have supported the Libyan people in their efforts to secure peace and stability. Finally, I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations system for their efforts to support the transition of Libya, and I commend my Special Representative, Tarek Mitri, for his strong leadership.

United Nations S/2013/517

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2013
English
Original: French

Letter dated 29 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to offer you the most sincere condolences of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its people following the death of a Tanzanian peacekeeper who was part of the Intervention Brigade of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The peacekeeper was killed near Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, by the terrorists of the negative force Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), who are being supported by forces of the regular Rwandan army. The attack took place as MONUSCO was providing support to the Forces armées de la République démocratiques du Congo (FARDC) as they were attempting to protect populated districts in Goma.

My Government strongly condemns the murder of this peacekeeper, which occurred in the course of the clashes that also resulted in the wounding of several peacekeepers, and expresses its sympathy to the victims' families and the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania and South Africa.

My Government wishes to pay a well-deserved tribute to the brave soldiers of the Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO and take this opportunity to express its support for the efforts of the United Nations to restore peace and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government wishes to reaffirm the substance of its letter of 23 August 2013 (S/2013/512) and to inform the Security Council that fighting resumed on Wednesday, 28 August 2013, and continued on Thursday, 29 August. In the evening of Wednesday, 28 August, four shells struck the city of Goma, in particular North Mabanga district, killing two persons, including a 13-year-old child, and seriously injuring 12 others. A house in Bujovu district suffered extensive damage. More shells struck the city Thursday morning. The sound of explosions in the city created panic among the population. Another shell may have struck Gisenyi (Rubavu), which is a Rwandan town that lies immediately across the border from Goma, and caused distress among our brothers and sisters on the other side of our common border.

This escalation of violence does not benefit either the people of Rwanda or those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Accordingly, my Government calls for an emergency meeting of the Security Council and urges the Council to:

1. Strongly condemn the terrorists of the M23 negative force and its ally, Rwanda, for their massacre of civilians in Goma, and consider this heinous and reprehensible act sponsored by Rwanda as a war crime and a crime against humanity and ask the International Criminal Court to treat it as such;

2. Impose sanctions against the leaders of M23;

3. Order the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the regular units of the Rwandan army from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

4. Invite Rwanda to respect the commitments that it entered into freely under the Framework agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013;

5. Take all necessary measures, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2098 (2013), to protect civilians in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government calls on the Security Council to follow up on this matter, and would be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a Council document.

(*Signed*) Ignace **Gata Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/67/973–S/2013/518

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 September 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 43
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 29 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 29 August 2013, addressed to you by Sertaç Güven, Chargé d'affaires a.i., of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex). I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit Çevik
Permanent Representative

13-46424 (E) 050913

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of the letter dated 27 August 2013 addressed to you by Dr. Derviş Eroğlu, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if the text of the letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sertaç **Güven**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure

I am writing to bring to your kind attention a legislative act recently adopted by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives which has caused great concern among our people, as it fosters intolerance against the Turkish Cypriots in the island and hampers prospects for building trust and confidence.

The amendment law relating to "standardization" of geographical names, which entered into force on 19 July 2013, aims to penalize, through imprisonment and/or payment of fine, anyone who edits, imports, releases, offers, distributes or sells maps, books or other documents, conventionally or digitally printed, which contain geographical or other names and place names, if they do not conform to the names designated by a Greek Cypriot committee, the "Cyprus Permanent Committee for the Standardization of Geographical Names".

With this amendment, the Greek Cypriot side seeks to punish anyone who acts against the decisions of this Committee which has, in the guise of "standardization", unilaterally portrayed geographical and place names in the whole island, including the North, as exclusively Greek. This is clearly an attempt, with racist underpinnings, to ignore or reject the presence of all other civilizations in the island in its long multicultural heritage.

Place names can identify and reflect culture, heritage and landscape and are important as significant elements of the cultural heritage of a nation as emphasized in resolutions V/6 and VIII/9 of the United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. The United Nations has taken a leading role in facilitating the setting of common rules for the standardization of names in the Conferences held under its auspices. The guiding principle adopted for standardization in these Conferences has been a practical one; it relates to how the inhabitants refer to an area.

The Greek Cypriot Committee, on the other hand, admitted before a number of United Nations Conferences, such as in the report it submitted to the Fifth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names in 1987, its own inability to engage in proper standardization in the North where it does not have the competence to verify place names under the control and jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, where the Greek Cypriot administration exercises no control or jurisdiction. The amendment provides for punishment for anyone who parts from the geographical names and place names submitted in the above-mentioned Conference. The purported "standardization" by the Greek Cypriot Committee is *ultra vires*, and *void ab initio*. As far as the South itself is concerned, the work of the Committee is criticized even by Greek Cypriot experts for serving "nationalistic interests" aimed at "Greek Cypriotization" of the island, and for being intolerant towards other cultures and civilizations.

The current legislation, which intends to take this inherently hostile process forward, violates human rights, including the freedom of expression. Although human rights instruments do not give authorities a licence to meddle with fundamental rights by being the arbiter of what is acceptable speech, and therefore acceptable opinion, this amendment intends to dictate the result of the "standardization" process, one that aims to exclude the Turkish Cypriot culture and cultural identity in the island, as the only opinion.

In addition to being ill-conceived, from a legal perspective, the amendment also lacks the quality of a law. It is too broad and vague, the "acceptable" names referred to are not even readily available and the amendment provides no guidance or foreseeability. Any legislation whose sole aim is to reinforce "Greek Cypriotization" of the island to the exclusion of all other civilizations cannot be a necessary measure in a democratic society. Enforcing such "standardization" through legislation involving imprisonment cannot constitute a "restriction proportional to the aim sought". As such, the amendment fails to meet the criteria required to pass scrutiny foreseen in international human rights instruments.

The immediate impact of this unfortunate legislation has been the deepening of mistrust between the two sides, and constitutes a serious obstacle to the work of the Technical Committees, which themselves aim to build confidence between the two sides by improving the daily life of ordinary people on both sides of the island. It is also a challenge to the delicate humanitarian work of the Committee on Missing Persons.

Although the purported "standardization" has been going on for some time, the current legislation to enforce the result of this process is very recent as well as ominous. It should be noted that this is among the first practices under the administration of newly elected Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Anastasiades. This piece of legislation, adopted unanimously, is sending a strong negative signal to the Turkish Cypriots before the negotiations in October. Contrary to your call for positive public messaging, this unfortunate move only serves to fuel ultra-nationalist sentiments encouraging extremist groups, such as the "ELAM" youth organization, which destroyed name plates in Turkish in the town of Larnaca in the South only in April this year, in their destructive behaviour.

I appeal to you to use your good offices to impress upon the Greek Cypriot side that it should desist from such harmful activities that are bound to have a negative effect on our efforts to start the negotiations and should concentrate their efforts on reconciliation and building confidence.

(*Signed*) Dr. Derviş **Eroğlu**
President

United Nations A/67/974–S/2013/519

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
5 September 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 30 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in connection with the letter dated 12 August 2013 (A/67/952-S/2013/478) regarding the practice of circulating propaganda letters by the Azerbaijani side (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-46666 (E) 120913

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Annex to the letter dated 30 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

Azerbaijan, whose attempts to abort the negotiation process for the peaceful settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic are becoming more evident, has resorted to new propaganda tricks.

The letter dated 19 July 2013, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan to the Secretary-General (A/67/952-S/2013/478, annex), is a vivid manifestation of such a policy of Azerbaijan.

This time Azerbaijan is trying to utilize for its political goals the Syrian crisis, which is currently under the focus of the international community, in particular the fate of the Syrian Armenians who, along with other Syrian refugees, are forced to find refuge in different parts of the world.

Overwhelmed by its mania of distorting the essence of the conflict and misleading the international community, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan did not hesitate to use obvious lies and misinformation. It should be noted in particular that no single person mentioned in the so-called "resettled people" list conveyed along with the letter to the United Nations Secretariat has ever been, and is not currently on, the territory of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.

Azerbaijan once again distorts and selectively interprets facts concerning the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, claiming that two field assessment missions of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs dispatched to Nagorno Karabakh have allegedly recorded "numerous violations of the norms and principles of international humanitarian law".

It is well known that those missions, which were carried out with the consent and support of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic authorities, in their reports refuted the Azeri allegations about the implementation of resettlement programmes. Meanwhile, it is appropriate to recall that Azerbaijan refused and still does not allow access for an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs field assessment mission to the occupied territories of Nagorno Karabakh, where, in an organized manner, large-scale projects for the settlement of Azeris are being implemented in previously Armenian-populated areas.

It is a matter of special concern that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a country with the status of non-permanent member of the Security Council uses direct threats in his letter.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic calls on the United Nations Member States to take measures preventing the attempts of Azerbaijan to use the high tribune of the United Nations for propaganda machinations, and to support the mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs in finding a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict between the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan.

Stepanakert, 30 August 2013

United Nations S/2013/520

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 September 2013
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 31 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following:

I have the honour to write to you at this critical and pivotal juncture in the history of my country, Syria, which is experiencing a severe crisis that is having a profound effect on the Syrian State as a whole and all of the Syrian people. At the same time, alarming statements are being made regarding ongoing preparations for a military aggression against Syria on the basis of groundless excuses, the most recent of which was the claim that chemical weapons have been used. In that connection, I should like to convey to you the following:

Beginning more than a year ago and on more than one occasion, the Syrian Government has warned of the serious dangers that could result from the possibility that armed terrorist groups might use chemical weapons in Syria. It has also conveyed information regarding the activities of those groups in formal letters to both the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Meanwhile, certain States that are directly responsible for the bloodshed in Syria and for preventing a peaceful solution have been leading a political, diplomatic and media campaign aimed at drawing attention to the matter of the so-called use of chemical weapons in Syria and holding the Syrian Government responsible for the use of any chemical substances. This is being done in preparation for the future use of this pretext against Syria.

The Syrian Government once again affirms that it has never used chemical weapons. It was, rather, the Syrian Government that requested the Secretary-General to form an objective scientific team to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the town of Khan Asal on 19 March 2013.

After the crime of the use of poisonous chemical gases was committed in Rif Dimashq on 21 August 2013, Syria's enemies capped their campaign of aggression by accusing the Syrian Government of committing this crime. Although the Syrian Government allowed the United Nations investigative team to visit the sites at which poisonous chemical gases were used, those States pre-empted the findings of the team's investigation and accused the Syrian Government of using chemical weapons in Rif Dimashq in order to justify committing the military aggression against Syria for which they have been planning.

After days of media propaganda and fear-mongering, the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, said the American administration has what it called

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confidential, irrefutable evidence, which it would later share with its people and the world, in order to justify launching its military aggression. This statement came despite the calls made by the international community and the United Nations to abide by the provisions of Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and to await the results of the investigation being conducted by the United Nations team, which is being led by professor Åke Sellström. Mr. Kerry relied on old stories that the terrorists have circulating for more than a week and that are full of fabrications, lies and deceptions. The information and numbers that Mr. Kerry proffered are utterly false. They are being bandied about by armed groups in Syria and certain elements of the foreign-based opposition that are agitating for American aggression against Syria. Diplomatic history is perhaps repeating itself in a tragic and regrettable theatrical scene that reminds the world of the false claims that Secretary of State Colin Powell made before the Security Council in order to justify his country's invasion of Iraq. What is puzzling is that, in their respective stories concerning Iraq in 2003 and Syria in 2013, both Secretaries Powell and Kerry used the same intelligence term to falsely sway American and international public opinion. The precise term that both Secretaries used is "high confidence".

With regard to Mr. Kerry's statements, we would like to make clear the following:

1. It is in the national interest of the Syrian State, Government and people to uncover the truth regarding claims that chemical weapons were used in Syria. In keeping with that national interest, the Syrian Government concluded an agreement with the United Nations to investigate three sites, among which is Khan Asal. It then allowed the investigative mission to visit the areas of Rif Dimashq that are the subject of the new allegations. I should like to inform you that, on 28 August 2013, the Syrian Government sent a new request to the Secretary-General calling on him to investigate three incidents that occurred in Rif Dimashq in which Syrian army troops inhaled poisonous gases.

2. The party that is now dispatching fleets and mobilizing troops and readying its rockets in preparation for attacking Syria is the very same one that opposed the adoption of a draft resolution that Syria put before the Security Council on 29 December 2003, at which time it was a Council member, aimed at ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction. It is also the same party that, at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, blocked the resolution calling for the convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in order to ensure that Israel would not have to comply with the requirements of such a conference.

3. The Syrian Government has challenged the American administration to produce a single piece of credible evidence to support claims that it has used chemical weapons. Mr. Kerry, however, publicly stated that his country was relying on "high confidence" information on the basis of false pictures taken from the Internet. As for the claim that a Syrian officer had made contact after the alleged attack, it is not worthy of the great intelligence-gathering capacity that a country such as the United States of America is supposed to possess.

4. The United Nations Secretariat has repeatedly stated that the traces of the use of poisonous gases do not dissipate with time. The accuracy of that is evidenced by the fact that it dispatched a team to investigate the Khan Asal incident five months

after the Syrian Government had requested that it should do so. Despite that, the Syrian Government did not delay in allowing the investigative team to enter the area in which the alleged attack took place. In fact, this occurred within 48 hours of the arrival in Damascus of the United Nations envoy, Angela Kane, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

5. Mr. Kerry has stated that the investigative team is not responsible for identifying the party that used chemical weapons and that its task is solely to determine whether such weapons were used. The purpose of that statement is to justify the American administration's circumvention of the Security Council. It should be recalled that, in its letter to the Secretary-General of 20 March 2013, the Syrian Government officially requested that the investigation should determine who it was that used chemical weapons in Khan Asal. That request, however, was rejected at the time by the delegations of the United States of America, Britain and France.

The world was expecting the United States to fulfil its role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and to work in partnership with the Russian Federation to make earnest preparations for the convening of the second Geneva conference. It was not expecting it to act as a State that uses military power against those who oppose its policies. Everyone was also anticipating that the United States would play a positive role in the effort to arrive at a peaceful, political solution to the crisis in Syria, under Syrian leadership. Many States believed that the United States would not make the same mistakes it had made in justifying its aggressions against Iraq, Libya and other countries. On the other hand, the Syrian Government officially and publicly stated its readiness to participate, without prior conditions, in a second Geneva conference. The position of Syria is in keeping with the openness with which the Syrian Government has responded to all sincere international and regional initiatives to resolve the Syrian crisis. Clearly, any party that is striving for a peaceful resolution to the situation in Syria would not need to publicly state its intention to provide the armed opposition with sophisticated weapons, with a view to changing the military balance on the ground. It should instead have a sincere desire to strive for the successful conclusion of the comprehensive national dialogue without prior conditions, and to use diplomacy to resolve this crisis.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic places great emphasis on ensuring the safety of the people of Syria and protecting its sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, and defending it against aggression. This is a right that is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls on the Secretary-General to shoulder his responsibility to uphold the principles of the Charter, exercise his good offices in order to prevent any aggression against Syria and push forward efforts aimed at arriving at a peaceful, political solution to the Syrian crisis. The Syrian Government further calls on the Security Council to hold fast to its mandate and maintain its role as a safety valve, the purpose of which is to prevent the arbitrary use of force outside the context of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if the present letter could circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative
of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

United Nations S/2013/521

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2102 (2013) of 2 May 2013, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) by 3 June 2013 for an initial period of one year, and requested me to report on the implementation of the Mission's mandate every 90 days, including the steps taken to ensure the presence of a structurally integrated mission by 1 January 2014, as well as an assessment of the political and security implications of wider United Nations deployments across Somalia. The present report provides the requested information together with an update on major developments in Somalia in the period from 16 May to 15 August 2013.

II. Major developments

A. Political situation

2. The main political goal of the period leading up to 2016, and a core requirement for long-term peace in Somalia, is to define the exact model of federalism in Somalia including the nature and role of government at the federal and regional state levels. In the reporting period, the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Parliament continued to take forward dialogue with existing regional administrations, as well as establishing some of the commissions required by the Provisional Constitution. However, continued disputes between the Federal Government and regional authorities in "Jubaland", Puntland and "Somaliland" underlined the vast scale of the task ahead.

3. On 16 June, the Constitutional Oversight Committee of the Federal Parliament formally launched the constitutional review process. The Committee expressed its commitment to a broad dialogue that would involve civil society and the Somali public throughout the country. A law establishing the Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission was adopted on 3 July. The selection of Commissioners is under way.

4. On 8 July, the Federal Parliament adopted a draft bill on the formation of provisional regional and district administrations. The President, however, has yet to sign it into law. Initial draft bills on political parties and the establishment of an Ombudsman were not adopted, and will be reconsidered at the next session.

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5. Draft bills setting up a Human Rights Commission and a Judicial Services Commission were also prepared, but their consideration was deferred to the next parliamentary session. A technical committee comprising representatives of the Government, the Federal Parliament and the National Union of Somali Journalists was formed to review a draft media law approved by the Council of Ministers on 11 July, after press freedom organizations, Somali media and journalists expressed their concerns over its provisions relating to media offences, regulatory mechanisms, and a requirement for journalists to reveal their sources.

6. The process of forming federal structures continued. From 17 to 19 June, leaders from the administrations of "Galmudug", Hiraan, and Himan and Heeb, as well as representatives of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a, civil society and the private sector, met in Mogadishu for consultations with the federal authorities on governance in the regions of central Somalia. The leaders agreed to improve cooperation with the Federal Government, and committed themselves to "genuine and sustainable" reconciliation and the strengthening of security structures. A technical committee was established to explore options for merging the parties' respective entities into one Federal State that would meet constitutional requirements.

7. Under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), dialogue continued between the Federal Government and the "Jubaland" leadership to identify options for the formation and establishment of an administration in "Jubaland". Negotiations lost momentum, however, after clashes between supporters of Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, known as Ahmed Madobe, the self-proclaimed president of the disputed "Jubaland State of Somalia", and supporters of two other claimants, Iftin Hassan and Barre Hirale, from 7 to 8 June and from 28 to 30 June respectively. Madobe blamed intervention by proxies of the Federal Government, and threatened on 3 July to suspend dialogue. Informal talks subsequently resumed, but no agreement had been reached at the time of reporting. The Federal Government announced that the national reconciliation conference planned for July, which had been intended to focus on the "Jubaland" process, would be postponed until September.

8. In addition to the facilitation role of IGAD in the "Jubaland" talks, regional partners did their part to help defuse tension in Kismaayo. On 4 August, leaders of countries contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), meeting in Kampala with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, recognized the authority of the Federal Government of Somalia over Kismaayo port and airport, and expressed their intention to have a multinational AMISOM presence there as requested by the Federal Government. Implementation of the measures is under discussion.

9. In Puntland, local council elections scheduled for 15 July were cancelled the preceding day because of growing election-related violence. The decision was welcomed by local communities, opposition parties and the international community. My Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, who had travelled to Puntland ahead of the polls, used his good offices to urge all parties to refrain from violence.

10. On 1 August, the President of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamed "Farole", announced a decision to suspend cooperation with the Federal Government, based on what he characterized as its lack of compliance with the Provisional Constitution

and inequitable distribution of international aid. My Special Representative encouraged the parties to address their concerns through dialogue. He met with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 6 August to urge the Federal Government to engage in confidence-building measures with the Puntland authorities.

11. Talks continued between the Federal Government authorities and those of "Somaliland". The ban imposed on United Nations flights since 15 May was lifted following talks between the Federal Government and the "Somaliland" authorities held in Istanbul, Turkey, from 7 to 9 July, during which the two parties agreed, inter alia, to establish a joint air traffic authority based in Hargeysa. However, during his visit to Hargeysa on 13 and 14 June, "Somaliland" authorities informed my Special Representative that UNSOM should not operate in "Somaliland", on the grounds that the territory is not part of the Federal Republic of Somalia and that UNSOM was mandated to work in Somalia only.

B. Security situation

12. Security remained extremely volatile. The reporting period saw a direct attack by Al-Shabaab on the United Nations in Mogadishu, and a surge of asymmetric attacks during the month of Ramadan (9 July to 7 August). This followed reports of upheaval in the leadership of Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, international forces undertook some reconfiguration: Ethiopian forces withdrew from Baidoa on 15 July, handing over security responsibilities to AMISOM and the Somali security forces. AMISOM deployed additional forces to Kismaayo, but continued to emphasize that it lacks the capacity to support new military advances.

13. On 19 June, Al-Shabaab operatives perpetrated a complex attack involving explosives and small arms on the United Nations common compound. One international staff member of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), three international United Nations contractors, four Somali guards and at least six Somali bystanders were killed. This was the first direct strike against the United Nations in Somalia since the bombing of the United Nations common compound in Hargeysa in 2008. Affected United Nations staff relocated to Mogadishu International Airport in order to allow continuation of critical programme activities.

14. There was a surge in violent attacks in the capital. In May and June, hand-grenade attacks in Mogadishu doubled compared to the start of the year. There were three times as many bombings in June as in January. Targeted killings occurred almost daily. There were at least four mortar attacks, including two against Villa Somalia on 20 May and 17 June. On 12 July, an improvised explosive device attack against an AMISOM convoy on the airport road in Mogadishu resulted in more than 17 civilian casualties. On 27 July, a complex attack by Al-Shabaab against a facility adjacent to the Turkish Embassy resulted in the death of one Turkish security officer and one civilian, and injured at least eight others.

15. Those incidents followed reports of a peak in tensions within Al-Shabaab's leadership. A violent clash between opposing factions in Baraawe (Shabelle Hoose region), on 19 June, reportedly resulted in the killing of two senior Al-Shabaab leaders, including its second-in-command, Ibrahim al-Afghani. On 26 June, former Al-Shabaab leader Hassan Dahir Aweys surrendered to the Himan and Heeb administration and was subsequently taken into Federal Government custody in

Mogadishu. Another prominent Al-Shabaab leader, Mukhtar Robow, was reportedly on the run, leaving Ahmed Godane as the overall leader of the group.

16. In the central regions, there was no major deterioration in security in Baidoa after the departure of Ethiopian forces. However, guerrilla attacks still occurred weekly, and the Deputy District Commissioner was killed on 17 July, apparently in a clan-related dispute. Two persons were detained in connection with the killing. Near-weekly guerrilla attacks also occurred in Ceel Barde and Xuddur in Bakool region, and Qansaxdheere, Gofgadud and Baidoa in Bay region. There were relatively few incidents in Galguduud or Hiraan regions, despite reports of Al-Shabaab mobilizing there.

17. Further south, the Federal Government, supported by AMISOM, continued its campaign against Al-Shabaab, while tensions among local political actors persisted. Kismaayo remained volatile: of two major violent clashes in June, one resulted in the death of some 70 civilians and the wounding of 300 more. Somali and AMISOM forces faced repeated armed attacks. Late in May, AMISOM deployed a Sierra Leonean contingent in the area, alongside Kenyan troops. The situation in Shabelle Hoose remained volatile, with continuing guerrilla and terrorist attacks, especially in Afgooye and Merca districts. The Federal Government and AMISOM recovered four villages in Janale district on 18 June. In Shabelle Dhexe, a surge in clan-based conflict resulted in several civilian casualties in Jawhar district late in May and in June.

18. In Puntland, attacks by Al-Shabaab decreased, although there were indications of continuing presence in the area, as evidenced by the arrest of a senior Al-Shabaab commander, on 4 June, threats of retaliation against the local administration, and reported infiltrations in Garoowe and Gaalkacyo. Clashes in Qardho resulted in eight reported deaths and over 10 injured and triggered the postponement of council elections. Crime, including some incidents linked to disgruntled Government elements, clan disputes, and piracy, continued to affect Puntland and Galmudug.

19. The security situation in "Somaliland" remained relatively stable, despite continued tension over the disputed Sool, Sanaag and Cayn region, and periodic clashes between "Somaliland" forces and the self-proclaimed "Khatumo State" militias. The "Somaliland" authorities also reportedly undertook a number of successful actions to arrest Al-Shabaab operatives.

III. United Nations support to peace consolidation

20. The United Nations effort in Somalia entered a new phase with the launch of UNSOM on 3 June as mandated by the Security Council in resolution 2102 (2013). Led by my new Special Representative, the United Nations worked to consolidate peace in Somalia in line with the integrated strategic approach set out in my report of 31 January 2013 (S/2013/69), grounded in the principle of respect of national ownership. The focus during the reporting period was on reinvigorating political support for the peace process in Somalia and fostering a new phase of cooperation with the international community, including through preparations for the "New Deal" aid compact (see para. 53 below).

A. Good offices and political support

21. Upon his arrival in Mogadishu on 3 June, my Special Representative gave priority to developing relationships with key Somali partners including politicians, elders, officials and civil society, and undertook a programme of visits around Somalia. Given escalating tensions in Kismaayo, he established close contacts with the "Jubaland" authorities and with international partners, in particular AMISOM and IGAD, as well as the Federal Government, to offer good offices. Partners agreed to take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in Kismaayo, support the evacuation of civilians injured in the armed clashes that occurred from 28 to 30 June, support the IGAD-led process to find an interim settlement for "Jubaland", and enable efforts to start the review of the Provisional Constitution.

22. My Special Representative also engaged with authorities in "Somaliland" and Puntland. In Hargeysa on 13 and 14 June, he made a commitment to supporting initiatives for sustainable peace, stability and prosperity, including the ongoing Somalia-"Somaliland" dialogue facilitated by Turkey. He also began dialogue with the authorities in "Somaliland" over their opposition to Security Council resolution 2102 (2013). Following his visit to Puntland, on 13 and 14 July, he continued working with the authorities and international partners to support an inclusive process for future elections there, as well as to facilitate improved relations with the Federal Government. In regular dialogue with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, he emphasized the importance of an inclusive process for national reconciliation, and offered the support of UNSOM at the appropriate time.

B. Support to peacebuilding and statebuilding

Development of a federal system and constitutional review

23. In addition to its political dimensions, the development of the federal system is a technical process requiring specialized capacity and international support. UNSOM and the United Nations country team engaged intensively with the Government, the Federal Parliament and the Speaker's Office on the process of constitutional reform. In close cooperation with the United Nations, the Speaker's Office produced a timeline for the constitutional review process, which sets out the steps leading up to a constitutional referendum and to national elections in 2016. A public presentation was held on 15 June, with support from UNDP. Noting the importance of an integrated United Nations effort, UNSOM and UNDP agreed steps to establish a United Nations integrated constitutional support team, to ensure coordinated support, and developed a strategy to guide its engagement with national partners.

Governance

24. On 19 June, the Office of the Prime Minister announced the creation of the National Institutional Capacity Development Directorate, which will lead and coordinate the Federal Government's efforts to develop capacity for core governance functions in Somalia. The United Nations country team and UNSOM established a joint task force to ensure a single United Nations entry point to engage with the new Directorate. Meanwhile, the United Nations joint programme on local

governance and decentralized service delivery completed a conflict assessment as part of preparations to support permanent local administrations in southern Somalia.

25. Financial governance also remained an area of focus. From May to July 2013, the Federal Government completed a payroll audit, collecting and verifying information on the number of civil servants working in the Federal Government institutions in Mogadishu. The exercise, supported by UNDP, will constitute an important first step towards the Government's plans to reform the civil service. Meanwhile, as part of the Government's public financial management reform strategy, UNDP advisers supported the Central Bank of Somalia in drafting a five-year strategic plan for central bank reform. Technical advisers on external audit and procurement issues commenced work in August.

Security sector and rule of law

26. Following the commitment of substantial international support at the London Conference on Somalia in May, the Federal Government made some progress in advancing mechanisms for the coordination of international partners' assistance and identifying policy gaps. Pending the establishment of the National Security Council, UNSOM supported the Government in leading coordination through an informal national security working group with international partners, which met twice in the reporting period. Sector-specific working groups on defence and police also met to coordinate capacity-building. The National Security Council and its secretariat have been established in order to enhance capacity for strategic decision-making and policy implementation across the security and defence sectors.

27. The management of combatants disengaging from Al-Shabaab remained an immediate priority of the Federal Government. In the reporting period UNSOM, in cooperation with AMISOM, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), supported the establishment of a secretariat to take forward the National Programme for Disengaging Combatants and Youth at Risk developed by the Federal Government in May 2013. A joint African Union-United Nations workshop was held from 24 to 28 June, together with the World Bank, to explore options for support to the Programme. UNSOM began to support the development of operational modalities, also highlighting the need to consider options for the de-radicalization of the former fighters as part of the process of rehabilitation and reintegration. UNSOM and UNDP also began a legal review of the Programme, to identify issues requiring clarification, especially with respect to the legal status of the beneficiaries.

28. Private security companies remained unregulated and, during the period under review, the Federal Government identified the need for policy guidance to bring them under legislative control. Following a request from the Ministry of the Interior, UNSOM and partners began to explore the scope for the development of a legal framework. UNSOM recommended that, in parallel, policies and practical measures be developed to manage weapons and ammunition, consistent with the requirements of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013).

Somali National Forces

29. Efforts to build the capacity of the Somali National Forces — currently estimated at some 20,000 personnel, including allied militias — continued during the reporting period, including specialist training for 175 personnel by the European

Union Training Mission in Uganda. Ninety-one officer cadets started a 12-month course at the Ugandan Military Academy. One thousand recruits completed training in Mogadishu, while Djiboutian forces of AMISOM in Beledweyne trained a further 600 recruits. UNSOM facilitated the coordination of all training activities through a Somali-led steering group, comprising "head trainers" from the Somali forces, the European Union Training Mission, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Bancroft Global Development.

30. The Somali forces continued to face significant logistical challenges, including lack of critical combat equipment and transport. The Federal Government urged its partners to make every effort to expedite logistical support in order to facilitate the offensive against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM provided mentoring and limited training to the Somali forces and police, and conducted joint operations with them. However, indiscipline continued to present a challenge, and there were reports of clashes within Somali security forces in Baidoa and Buurhakaba, and an increasing number of desertions in Bay and Bakool.

Police

31. The Somali police continued to face asymmetric attacks and serious capacity gaps, including in basic equipment, infrastructure and management, undermining its ability to respond to local needs. International support, including stipends and training, continues, but lack of coherence undermines its effectiveness in some instances. For example, police uniforms provided by various countries have made it difficult to distinguish the police from other armed groups. In July, with support from UNSOM and UNDP, the Somali Police Commissioner launched a working group with international partners expected to meet monthly to ensure coordination. The Commissioner indicated his intention to prioritize rebuilding specialist policing capabilities that collapsed during the conflict. AMISOM police personnel continued to provide specialist support, as well as operational command and control advice and mentoring. UNDP and UNSOM put in place arrangements to ensure joint delivery in Somalia, including embedding a senior UNDP police programme officer in UNSOM. Noting the need for well-tailored support to policing in Puntland, two UNSOM police officers deployed to Garoowe in July.

Justice and corrections

32. The Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice, and the international community continued to work to steer the inclusive implementation of the national strategic plan for justice reform (2013-2015). In July, UNSOM, UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) established a donor coordination forum that will meet monthly. The group identified urgent needs, including court security, access to justice, legal policy and legal drafting, judicial independence, and establishing basic justice delivery in recovered areas. Development partners committed themselves to channelling resources for justice support through a rule of law basket fund, but have yet to finalize the modalities for the utilization of the funds.

33. UNSOM and UNDP put in place arrangements for a joint justice and corrections effort, within the framework of the global focal point relating to the rule of law. Meanwhile, United Nations partners continued to work on priority initiatives to support the sector. UNDP began an assessment aimed at improving the safety of

judicial personnel, following attacks in Mogadishu and Puntland, completed new headquarters for the Attorney General and Judicial Services Council in Puntland, and also supported a six-month judicial training programme for the region. UNODC, through the United Nations Office for Project Services, constructed a building for the Ministry of Justice in Garoowe, and is nearing completion of a building for the equivalent Ministry in Hargeysa. UNDP and UNODC supported the development of the judicial reform strategy of "Somaliland".

34. UNSOM worked with the Ministry of Justice's Custodial Corps, UNODC and UNDP on establishing a Government-led working group on corrections. In partnership with the Ministry, UNSOM developed a module on probation and parole for the training of prison staff. UNODC continued its engagement in Puntland and "Somaliland", including various construction, rehabilitation, mentoring and training projects.

Maritime security

35. Piracy off the coast of Somalia continued to decline in the reporting period. As at 15 August, one large and six small vessels were held by pirates. One vessel that had previously been held, the MV *Albedo*, sank off Xarardheere on 6 July: 4 of the 15 hostages on board remain unaccounted for, while 11 were transferred to another location. The conditions that allow piracy to thrive still persist in Somalia, and international support for maritime security continued to be strong, including through regional and national working groups on counter-piracy and maritime resource and security strategy. The Government announced a maritime crime programme, including the deployment of coastguard and maritime police trainers.

Explosive ordnance management

36. Somali police trained by the United Nations Mine Action Service continued regular clearance operations in Mogadishu, securing 29 improvised explosive devices, as well as 753 items of unexploded ordnance. Basic underwater clearance operations commenced at Mogadishu port. Two permanently deployed teams began operations in Baidoa, and by 15 August had found two improvised explosive devices and 50 items of unexploded ordnance, and provided the district with its first police explosive ordnance disposal capacity.

37. The Mine Action Service also conducted mine and unexploded ordnance clearance in the urban areas of Beledweyne, clearing 341 items of unexploded ordnance. Some 34 teams conducted mine risk education throughout southern and central Somalia, reaching out to some 157,000 people, as well as training United Nations staff and other humanitarian workers. From 16 May to 15 August, advisers from the Service and AMISOM explosive ordnance disposal teams safely destroyed 1,162 units of unexploded ordnance and 18 improvised explosive devices and cleared some 105,950 m^2 of battle area across all four sectors.

C. Human rights and protection

38. The Federal Government reiterated its intention to pursue a policy of "zero tolerance of all forms of human rights violations". However, effective protection of human rights in Somalia continues to be impeded by a lack of strong rule of law institutions. In a positive development, the Government prepared a draft bill on the

establishment of a national human rights commission required under the Constitution. UNSOM encouraged the Government to undertake broad consultations on the bill and to take account of the Paris principles relating to the status of national institutions. Meanwhile, UNSOM gradually built up its capacity for reporting on human rights and protection concerns while also developing contacts with Somali counterparts, AMISOM and donors to build capacity to prevent and address abuses.

39. During the reporting period, the negative impact of the armed conflict on civilians, as well as the targeting of journalists, remained of particular concern. In July, one journalist and two human rights defenders working with local human rights organizations were killed in Gaalkacyo, while two other journalists were wounded in gun attacks in Kismaayo. Civilian casualties and extrajudicial killings were frequently reported in conflict areas, with civilians caught in the crossfire between the parties. The Federal Government of Somalia reiterated to UNSOM its opposition to all extrajudicial killings and its commitment to due process. Separately, and despite Somalia's commitment under the 2012 universal periodic review to a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, at least seven persons were executed in Mogadishu, Beledweyne and Garoowe in July and August after death sentences were issued by military courts.

40. In partnership with the United Nations and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, AMISOM continued to work to improve the protection of civilians in recovered areas through an "indirect fire policy" and "no fire zones" in densely populated areas. The establishment of a civilian casualty tracking, analysis and response cell is still pe..ding. UNSOM contributed to predeployment training for AMISOM troops, as well as training for officers of the Somali security forces on international human rights and humanitarian law.

Child protection

41. Grave violations perpetrated against children by armed groups and the Somali security forces continued throughout the country, notwithstanding the commitments made by the Government to address the problem. In June, the United Nations verified reports of violations against 291 boys and 23 girls, primarily abduction (46 per cent of cases) and forced recruitment by armed groups (39 per cent of cases), mostly in the Banadir and Bakool regions. Armed conflict in southern and central Somalia seriously impeded access by the United Nations and other actors monitoring and responding to child protection needs. During the June violence in Kismaayo, 18 children were reportedly killed and 25 injured. The destruction of facilities for education and health, social deprivation and harsh living conditions exacerbated by displacement also had a negative impact on children. While UNSOM began to establish its capacity for support to child protection, UNSOM and UNICEF held initial consultations with the Federal Government on the implementation of two action plans aimed at ending the recruitment and use of children, as well as their killing and maiming.

Sexual and gender-based violence

42. Sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls remained one of the most insidious consequences of the conflict, despite the stated commitment of the Federal Government to end impunity for such acts. Related incidents were

reportedly most numerous in the Afgooye and Bala'd corridor near Mogadishu, and in camps for internally displaced persons in the southern and central parts of the country. Women and girls were targeted for rape, including gang rape, as well as other acts of sexual violence, particularly in settlements for displaced persons in Mogadishu. Most perpetrators were armed, and, in some cases, security personnel. Impunity remained rife, as survivors fear retaliation by their attackers. The justice system is ill-equipped to provide effective recourse for victims as the Penal Code defines rape as a moral crime rather than a crime against the person, so that survivors fear being stigmatized if they disclose incidents of rape or other sexual violence. Police capacity to investigate such crimes, gather evidence and protect victims remained limited. During the reporting period, the United Nations continued to work with partners using a new gender-based violence investigation and monitoring system to track trends and patterns of different forms of violence against children and adults. Preventive and responsive programming continued, including provision of victim assistance, counselling and livelihood support.

D. Humanitarian situation

43. The humanitarian situation continued to improve, as a result of improved security in pockets of the country, sustained assistance, and favourable weather conditions. However, humanitarian needs remained considerable, with 1 million Somalis depending on assistance for their basic needs and one in seven children acutely malnourished. Some 1.7 million people who emerged from the 2011 famine risk falling back into crisis without sustained support. Insecurity continued to hamper humanitarian access in some areas. Following the attack on the United Nations on 19 June, humanitarian activities in Mogadishu were limited to life-saving interventions.

44. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recorded a significant improvement in displacement figures for the first half of 2013 as compared to the same period in 2012. As a result of some security gains, some 24,500 refugees returned to Somalia between January and July 2013, mostly from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. However, there are still an estimated 1.1 million internally displaced persons, as well as more than a million Somalis living as refugees in neighbouring countries.

45. On 9 May, the first polio case since 2007 was confirmed, and as at 15 August 105 cases had been confirmed. To curb the spread of the disease, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF carried out five campaigns, vaccinating 4 million people. Unfortunately large parts of southern and central Somalia remained inaccessible owing to insecurity, leaving approximately 600,000 children vulnerable to the disease.

46. The consolidated appeal of US$1.15 billion for 2013-2015 was only 34 per cent funded as at 15 August, jeopardizing efforts to build the population's resilience to future shocks such as drought, and to provide durable solutions for internally displaced persons. In July, the Central Emergency Response Fund's underfunded window approved additional funding of $20 million for consolidated appeal projects, and was considering additional funds for the polio vaccination campaign.

47. Notwithstanding security constraints, humanitarian activities aimed at enhancing communities' resilience to drought and other shocks are ongoing

throughout the country. The World Food Programme (WFP) provided assistance to more than 1.4 million people in the first half of 2013, focusing on livelihood projects. WFP operated in 1,198 nutrition centres throughout the country, and initiated in "Somaliland" and Puntland a new food assistance programme involving bar-coded vouchers that had reached over 31,000 people by June. UNICEF also provided nutrition support to over 135,000 malnourished children throughout the country, and helped to improve water and sanitation for over 292,000 people. More than 77,600 children, including 32,000 girls, were enrolled in schools sponsored by UNICEF during the 2012-2013 academic year.

E. Socioeconomic recovery and development

48. Support to socioeconomic recovery is essential to peacebuilding in Somalia. The country's economy has been in recession since the outbreak of the civil war two decades ago. Its per capita gross domestic product of $284 remains among the lowest in the world, and approximately 73 per cent of the population lives under the poverty line of $2 per day, rural populations being the worst affected. Reliable economic data on Somalia remains limited, however, hindering the ability of the Government and international community to carry out evidence-based planning.

49. As part of its planning for the "New Deal" aid compact (see para. 53 below), the Ministry of Finance and Planning, with support from the World Bank, began to develop an economic recovery plan identifying the priority investments and policy actions required during the period from 2013 to 2015. The plan will serve as the basis for the elaboration of an interim poverty reduction strategy, which will be presented at the forthcoming Conference on Somalia in Brussels together with proposals for a financial architecture for Somalia and aid coordination mechanisms.

50. In a positive development, on 7 June, the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States approved the Federal Government's application to accede to the Cotonou Agreement, which will enhance its access to resources for development finance cooperation under the European Development Fund. At the Group of Eight Summit on 17 and 18 June, international financial institutions were encouraged to deepen their engagement with Somalia to support the country's growth and stability.

51. Meanwhile, efforts were made to develop the Somali private sector. The first Somali Reconstruction and Investment Conference was held on 28 and 29 May, with support from UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Labour Organization. Bringing together national and international business leaders, the conference helped to leverage some $1.5 million in new deals. Short-term employment schemes implemented by UNDP, FAO and IOM generated approximately 14,000 working days for some 36,850 people.

F. Targeted sanctions

52. The Security Council, by resolution 2111 (2013), consolidated the arms embargo exemptions contained in previous resolutions, and affirmed current exemptions to the arms embargo on Somalia for UNSOM, AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission and the items listed in the annex to that resolution. The Council also extended the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

until 25 November 2014. The most recent report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413) was issued on 12 July 2013.

IV. International coordination

53. The development of a "New Deal" aid framework for Somalia was a key priority during the reporting period. The New Deal process is intended to make possible a strategic partnership between Somalia and international partners through the establishment of national peacebuilding priorities and agreement on a framework for mutual accountability. Within the United Nations, efforts on the New Deal are coordinated through the Office of the Resident Coordinator.

54. Following the official launch of the process in May, the United Nations and the World Bank supported the Federal Government in conducting a "fragility assessment" to analyse sources of fragility and conflict, as well as of resilience. In parallel, UNSOM and the United Nations country team contributed actively to planning under six Somali-led thematic workstreams, with UNSOM leading the United Nations effort in goals 1 (inclusive politics) and 2 (security), and co-leading with UNDP on goal 3 (justice). A New Deal Task Force comprising the Government, civil society, the United Nations, the World Bank and donor representatives provided recommendations for a communications strategy around the New Deal.

55. My Special Representative addressed two meetings of the core group preparing for the New Deal for Somalia Conference that will be held in Brussels on 16 September. At those meetings, the Government presented its plans for streamlining existing funding instruments into a Somali reconstruction and development facility. However, there remained challenges with regard to prioritization by the Government and its partners, as well as engagement with "Somaliland" and Puntland. "Somaliland" has so far refused to participate in the New Deal conference, which in its view does not concern "Somaliland".

56. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2102 (2013), in which the Council mandated UNSOM to assist the Federal Government in coordinating international donor support, and to coordinate United Nations activities with the Federal Government, as well as the African Union, IGAD, the European Union and other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners in Somalia, my Special Representative also prioritized the building of close and effective partnerships with these and other key stakeholders. He briefed ambassadors from the AMISOM troop-contributing countries on 18 July, held numerous informal meetings with ambassadors and international officials, and visited Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Djibouti, Kampala, Brussels, Paris and London. The guiding principles of UNSOM coordination efforts include ensuring that mechanisms put in place enhance the support provided to the Federal Government and are aligned with national priorities, and eventually with the New Deal architecture.

V. Logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia

57. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) continued to provide logistical support for the 17,731 AMISOM uniformed personnel deployed to four sectors in Somalia, including 17,244 troops, two formed police units and

207 individual police officers. In addition, some 20 civilian personnel of AMISOM received transport and other logistic assistance from UNSOA. Living conditions for troops and civilian personnel continued to improve, with the construction of 17 additional offices and accommodation facilities.

58. Major troop and police movements were supported by UNSOA. These included, in June, the deployment of an 850-strong battalion from Sierra Leone to Kismaayo, Dhobley and Tabda in Sector 2 (comprising Gedo, Juba Hoose and Juba Dhexe), where they relieved Kenyan troops. Together with the African Union, UNSOA verified this relief-in-place in accordance with Security Council resolution 2093 (2013). Several rotations were conducted, including a Nigerian formed police unit and 1,340 Ugandan troops in May, 1,020 Burundian troops in June, a Ugandan formed police unit in July, and 900 Burundian troops in August.

59. During the reporting period, AMISOM engineering units trained and equipped by UNSOA constructed 20 km of bypasses, repaired 3 km of roads and built or improved seven forward operating bases. Troops in Beledweyne continued to be supplied by air due to the security situation. In Kismaayo and Beledweyne, UNSOA drilled wells to secure access to water for AMISOM and, in Mogadishu, a satellite dish was installed in July to enhance communications and Internet access. UNSOA also continued to provide medical support, carrying out 77 medical evacuation, transfer, redeployment and repatriation flights for AMISOM personnel from 16 May to 14 August. UNSOA also provided various types of training for 517 troops.

60. Notwithstanding the logistical support from the United Nations and voluntary contributions from Member States, AMISOM continued to face logistical and resource constraints that undermined the fulfilment of its mandate. AMISOM has not secured any military helicopters, although UNSOA contracted three utility helicopters for medical evacuation, personnel transportation, and cargo lift. As stated in the report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Dlamini Zuma, dated 13 June 2013, the ability of AMISOM to conduct expansion operations will continue to be limited in the absence of critical force multipliers and enablers.

61. In July, all AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries received a copy of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy. It was agreed that a $6.5 million contribution from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the trust fund for AMISOM managed by UNSOA will finance the establishment of the AMISOM civilian casualty tracking, analysis and response cell as well as other infrastructure projects and training. The additional uncommitted balance of the trust fund remains at $2.6 million, most of which is earmarked for outreach activities. Since my last report, there have been no new contributions to the trust fund.

62. The African Union-United Nations Information Support Team continued to provide strategic communications support to AMISOM, and established during the reporting period a permanent communications presence in Kismaayo and Baidoa. Preparations are under way to permanently deploy personnel to Beledweyne.

VI. United Nations presence in Somalia

A. Expansion of the United Nations presence

63. As at 15 August, a total of 309 international personnel from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes were deployed in Somalia, 21 of them in southern and central Somalia. The attack on the United Nations common compound on 19 June curtailed some of the country team's operations in Mogadishu, although activities designated as most critical to programme delivery, such as the polio vaccination campaign and engagement with the Federal Government, continued.

B. Establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

64. As at 15 August, 56 staff were deployed in UNSOM, including 29 permanently recruited international staff, 12 international staff on temporary duty, and 15 national staff. Of the permanent international staff, 22 were deployed in Mogadishu, four in Garoowe and three in Nairobi. A further 22 permanently recruited and nine temporary staff are expected to join the Mission in the coming weeks. Owing to the opposition of the "Somaliland" authorities to UNSOM (see paras. 11 and 22 above), there are no permanently deployed international UNSOM personnel in Hargeysa.

65. UNSOA provided administrative and logistical support for the new Mission, including offices and residential accommodation, camp management, communications, transport, and a range of administrative services. The African Union-United Nations Information Support Team managed by UNSOA also extended strategic communications support to UNSOM. A draft status-of-mission agreement for UNSOM was transmitted to the Federal Government on 6 June. The Government's response is awaited.

C. Integration of United Nations activities

66. Further to Security Council resolution 2102 (2013), arrangements were made to support a structurally integrated United Nations presence in Somalia. My Special Representative and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Philippe Lazzarini, agreed to adopt an integrated management approach with immediate effect, ahead of formal integration of the Coordinator function by 1 January 2014. To this end, the office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Nairobi is now co-located with UNSOM. Within the framework of the global focal point relating to the rule of law, UNSOM and UNDP began to implement plans for a joint rule of law presence supporting one programme, although co-location was delayed as a result of the attack of 19 June and the temporary relocation of UNDP personnel to Nairobi. The establishment of an integrated constitutional support team is also under way.

67. UNSOM reinforced coordination with AMISOM through regular meetings of the senior leadership team of both entities. Progress is being made on promoting joint UNSOM-AMISOM work across the board, including on human rights, rule of law and security institutions.

D. Staff safety and security

68. With the launch of UNSOM, the United Nations established an integrated security management structure with my Special Representative as designated official responsible for staff security in Somalia. However, continuing insecurity and the targeting of the international community in Somalia hampered the operational effectiveness of the Mission, as well as the ongoing expansion of the United Nations country team.

69. The United Nations, AMISOM and the Federal Government worked to enhance physical security measures, information analysis, and coordination procedures in Mogadishu. Measures were taken jointly to improve security at United Nations installations, along the Mogadishu airport road, and at Villa Somalia, through multiple layers of static security and mobile patrols conducted by Somali forces and AMISOM. Emergency and crisis response mechanisms were reviewed, staff were briefed on incident response and a mass casualty evacuation plan was reviewed and updated. Concerns remain about security in the vicinity of Mogadishu International Airport, and dialogue is ongoing with the Government and AMISOM to address outstanding issues.

70. Security for activities outside the Mogadishu airport complex remained a significant challenge. While in the longer term the Federal Government is planning to establish a diplomatic protection service, the United Nations and other international partners rely in the interim on AMISOM and Government-authorized private security companies for security services. The UNSOM security concept identifies significant requirements not met by the existing arrangements, including expanded capacity for security escorts and quick reaction capability to cover southern and central Somalia. In her report dated 13 June 2013, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission reiterated the African Union's commitment to providing security for the international community, but noted that the currently authorized ad hoc unit of 311 military personnel would not be sufficient to accomplish the required tasks.

VII. Observations

71. The people and Government of Somalia have made significant progress over the past year to consolidate security and put in place credible state institutions. The international community has demonstrated its continued engagement, including through international conferences in London, Istanbul, Yokohama and Brussels, as well as the strong support for the establishment of the new political mission, UNSOM. While much has been achieved, progress is not yet secure. While I remain optimistic about Somalia's long-term prospects, I am increasingly concerned about the short-term risks. We need to increase significantly our collective efforts, if we are not to imperil the recent and hard-won political and security gains.

72. The Federal Government is to be commended for its efforts at establishing, in line with the Provisional Constitution, state institutions able to deliver critical basic services to the people of Somalia. But progress on key political processes, such as the formation of federal states and the constitutional review, has been slow. The recent pre-election violence in Puntland serves as an important reminder that democratization processes require a well-prepared, conducive political and security

environment. To realize its vision for elections in 2016, the Federal Government will need to accelerate the establishment of the necessary commissions and initiate a comprehensive consultation with the Somali people about the future of the State, resulting eventually in a constitution endorsed by the majority of the Somalis through a national referendum. The United Nations stands ready to support an inclusive process.

73. The recent violence in Kismaayo underlines the challenges involved in establishing a federal system. It is essential that an interim political solution is found to prevent further violence and to allow longer-term issues about the status and administration of "Jubaland" to be addressed through dialogue and reconciliation. The United Nations welcomes and fully supports the efforts of IGAD in this regard, noting the importance of forging new relationships of trust between Somalia and its neighbours as part of the peacebuilding process. Noting the economic dimensions of the conflict in "Jubaland", I also call upon all stakeholders urgently to tackle the continuing illegal export of charcoal, as highlighted in the recent report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group. Profits from this trade fuel the conflict, undermine governance and destroy the environment.

74. The continuing commitment of the international community to support the people and Government of Somalia is essential. At the same time, peacebuilding must be Somali-owned. I therefore welcome efforts under way for the Government to elaborate a vision for peacebuilding priorities, which will also guide the efforts of its international partners. The "New Deal" for Somalia recognizes the interconnectedness of political reconciliation, security, rule of law, governance and economic and social development processes. I welcome the forthcoming New Deal for Somalia Conference scheduled for 16 September in Brussels, which will finalize the outline of a compact between the Government and its international partners. As putting in place the full New Deal architecture will take time, I urge Member States in the short term to help expedite delivery for immediate needs, including the provision of basic security, justice and other services in the newly recovered areas of the country.

75. I remain seriously concerned about the human rights situation in Somalia, in particular attacks against journalists, and violations and abuses perpetrated against children and women. I call on the Federal Government to demonstrate its commitment to addressing human rights violations, including by establishing a national human rights commission based on broad-based consultations, and strengthening policing and legal capacity to address sexual violence. Innocent Somali citizens caught in the crossfire between parties continue to be killed and maimed. Journalists also continue to be victims. It is essential that the United Nations partnerships established with the Government in these areas lead to early action.

76. The political, security and development gains made so far in Somalia are still reversible. Despite the courageous efforts of the Government, its allied forces and AMISOM, Al-Shabaab continues to undermine security throughout the country, including in Mogadishu. While recent infighting shows that Al-Shabaab is now divided and under pressure, it remains capable of carrying out intensified attacks against civilians and international partners. Allowing Al-Shabaab to continue its training and conduct terrorist activities from bases in Somalia will undermine peace not only in Somalia but also in the wider region. Reinvigorating the campaign

against Al-Shabaab must therefore be an urgent priority. It should combine military, political and practical components, including a clear policy on the handling of disengaged combatants, their rehabilitation and reintegration into society, and immediate early recovery projects in newly accessible areas. At the same time, it will be of the utmost importance for the Government to develop policy and practical measures in the areas of security sector management, maritime security, police and justice.

77. The campaign against Al-Shabaab urgently requires enhanced international support. I once again call upon all international partners, as well as African Union member States that have not already done so, to provide AMISOM with adequate support, particularly critical force enablers and multipliers, such as attack helicopters and armoured personnel carriers, to ensure that it can effectively fulfil its mandate. I have instructed my Special Representative to redouble his efforts to secure these resources for AMISOM, in conjunction with the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif. Meanwhile, further to Security Council resolution 2093 (2013), I and the African Union have jointly initiated an operational review of AMISOM in the light of the current security challenges. The review, on which I will report to the Council in October, will be linked with the development of options and corresponding benchmarks for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the right time.

78. Stability in Somalia rests on credible national security forces and police able to maintain security independently of any peacekeeping force. A common and closely coordinated strategy for international security support, which sets out clearly the respective responsibilities of the African Union, the United Nations, other allies, and Somali forces, with clear timelines and appropriate resources, is a priority. In the immediate term, significant additional support is needed to allow Somali national security forces to take part in joint operations with AMISOM more effectively and to ensure that security gains are not lost in the newly liberated areas. I encourage Member States to give urgent attention to the planning, equipment, logistical and training needs of Somalia's national army and police. I also encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to provide a detailed report to the Security Council by 6 October 2013 as stipulated in paragraph 9 of resolution 2111 (2013). Doing so will strengthen the ability of UNSOM and other international partners to support the Government in developing capacity for the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment.

79. Expanding humanitarian services throughout the country is essential. I call on all actors to facilitate the safe access that would allow all of Somalia's people, particularly children, to receive humanitarian assistance, including vital vaccinations against polio. The findings released earlier in 2013 that an estimated 260,000 people died as a result of the 2011 famine remind us that we cannot wait to act. We must redouble efforts to invest in Somalia's people and communities to break the pattern of repeated humanitarian crises. I urge Somalia's partners to support the humanitarian appeal for Somalia, which seeks to build the capacity of Somali communities and the authorities to prevent future humanitarian catastrophe.

80. The attack against the United Nations on 19 June was a sobering reminder of the risks that our personnel face in their work to support peace and development in Somalia. I condemn in the strongest terms the deadly violence perpetrated during

the reporting period against Somali nationals, the United Nations, AMISOM, and Turkey. We shall not be deterred from our work; at the same time, we must anticipate that, as the campaign against Al-Shabaab continues, threats to Government and international personnel and installations will correspondingly increase. This underlines the importance of taking appropriate measures to provide security throughout the country. I will request the Security Council to give due consideration to this issue, including on the basis of the recommendations of the joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM and benchmarking exercise.

81. Member States have asked UNSOM to play a significant role in convening with international partners and coordinating international assistance for the Federal Government of Somalia and in providing the Government with "one United Nations door to knock on". Good progress is being made in integrating the United Nations presence in Somalia ahead of formal integration in January 2014. The Mission's mandate is far-reaching and ambitious. UNSOM will continue to depend on the goodwill of national, regional and international partners. I am grateful to them for the practical and political support they have given my Special Representative so far, and look forward to this continuing. We remain steadfast in our resolve to work in partnership with all stakeholders.

82. In conclusion, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my Special Representative for Somalia, Nicholas Kay, and pay a tribute to the men and women of UNSOM and the United Nations country team, for their courage, sacrifice, and commitment to peace in Somalia. I would also like to thank the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union and the countries contributing troops and police to AMISOM, IGAD, the European Union, and the donor countries and multilateral and non-governmental organizations that are providing critical and life-saving support. There is no time for complacency. Our collective efforts need to be redoubled if we are to succeed in helping the people and Government of Somalia to lift their country from conflict and despair to sustained peace and hope.

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Identical letters dated 29 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in July 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as an official document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-46528 (E) 090913 110913

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Annex to the identical letters dated 29 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 July 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy Hummer vehicle stopped opposite a Lebanese Army position, where four soldiers stepped out and crossed the technical line by approximately six metres. They departed at 0825 hours.
	1330	On the outskirts of Kafr Shuba (Hasan Gate 2), near the position of the Indian unit (14-4), a group of 20 Israelis, five of whom were military personnel, accompanied by 1 Merkava tank, 2 Defender vehicles and 1 civilian vehicle, crossed the technical fence and proceeded to inspect it and also to examine a prefabricated structure in the above-mentioned area. The persons and vehicles deployed themselves in the area and took up combat positions, pointing their weapons towards Lebanese Army personnel and Lebanese territory.
	1426	A Merkava tank crossed the technical fence and positioned itself opposite the Wazzani Fort resort but did not cross the Blue Line.
	1515	On the outskirts of Shab'a town south of position C7-4 (Birkat al-Naqqar), where the Indian unit of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is stationed, an Israeli enemy patrol abducted the civilians Yusuf Kahil and Yusuf Zahrah, who had been grazing their flock. The patrol fired into the air and led the two men into occupied territory.
	1710	A 10-man Israeli enemy patrol opened the old Abbasiyah gate and deployed around it. Two soldiers crossed the technical fence by one metre and remained there for two minutes before leaving at 1720 hours.
	2230	From the Ra's Naqurah position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory for 10 seconds.
3 July 2013	0700	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank and a Defender vehicle moved into the Wazzani area, crossed the technical fence and positioned itself behind the berm. The tank trained its cannon on Lebanese territory and eight soldiers stepped out and headed in the direction of the river bank. At 0800 hours, the gate was closed and the patrol left the site.
	2230	The Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory from within its position inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite Ra's Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 July 2013	0935 0945	While the Lebanese Army's tactical subcommittee on the Blue Line and the UNIFIL team were working on marking the Blue Line near point B3, an Israeli enemy patrol from within occupied Palestinian territory trained its weapons on the members of the joint commission.
	1300	An Israeli enemy took some 400 livestock from the area near the Radar position into the occupied Golan. The livestock belonged to the Syrian citizens Mohammed al-Safadi and Ali Musa.
8 July 2013	0925	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising three tanks crossed the technical fence opposite Yarun at point BP23 and approached point B52 opposite Marun al-Ra's. At 1200 hours, the patrol returned into occupied Palestinian territory
	1040	Several explosions and bursts of light and medium machine-gun fire were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1500	A 10-person Israeli patrol crossed the line of withdrawal in the occupied Shab'a Farms and entered Lebanese territory in the area of Marah al-Haswa, north of the Israeli enemy's Radar position. They abducted a shepherd, Yusuf Rahil, and attempted to abduct another shepherd, Yusuf Zahrah, who fled to the post of the Indian unit attached to UNIFIL. The former was released at 1800 hours on that same day, after he had been interrogated at the Israeli enemy position at Maqasir al-Dud.
9 July 2013	1142	An 11-person Israeli enemy patrol moved into the northern part of the occupied town of Ghajar, where they deployed inside and on the roof a building. They took up combat positions, training their personal automatic weapons on Lebanese territory in the direction of road SD1 and the Spanish unit observation point.
12 July 2013	0827	Five Israeli enemy soldiers crossed the technical fence and violated the Blue Line by some three metres at the point located at coordinates Q:736461 - N:677304. At 0904 hours, the patrol left the site and returned into occupied territory.
	1125	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Land Rover vehicle, a Hummer vehicle and a civilian car moved into the Wazzani area, where five soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by approximately 100 metres. They closed the gate and left the site at 1130 hours.
	1255	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a Defender vehicle moved into the Wazzani area, where nine soldiers and a dog stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence into the area by the river. At 1300 hours, the Hummer vehicle went some 100 metres beyond the gate. At 1325 hours, the patrol closed the gate and left the site.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	2200	While a Lebanese Army vehicle was being moved from the Labbunah position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards the vehicle from its position in Ra's Naqurah for half a minute.
13 July 2013	0130	From its Zar'it barracks position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army positions at Tarbikha and Jabal al-Balat and in the direction of the Ramiya road for half a minute.
14 July 2013	1430	Several explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1530	
17 July 2013	1420	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank, two Hummer vehicles and a Land Rover vehicle moved into the area opposite a Lebanese Army position in Maysat, where 12 soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. The tank crossed the technical fence, positioned itself behind the berm and trained its cannon on Lebanese territory. The enemy soldiers came onto the road that had recently been built. At 1615 hours, three Hummer vehicles, three civilian vehicles and three Defender vehicles arrived at the site. Fifteen soldiers stepped out, crossed the technical fence and reached the area by the tank behind the berm. At 1650 hours, the entire patrol left the site with its vehicles, closed the gate and headed back into occupied territory.
24 July 2013	2320	The Israeli enemy fired three flare shells, one over the Rumaysh gate and two over the Lebanese Army position.
29 July 2013	1830	Several bursts of automatic gunfire were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1930	
30 July 2013	1145	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and two Merkava tanks moved into the Wazzani area, where 13 soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence with a Merkava tank that positioned itself behind the berm. At 1500 hours the soldiers headed back to the occupied area, with the exception of two Merkava tanks. At 2315 hours, the Merkava tank that had crossed the technical fence headed back to the occupied area, and the gate was closed.
31 July 2013	1500	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Land Rover vehicle and a Hummer vehicle moved into the Wazzani area, where five soldiers and a dog stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence. The patrol left the site at 1600 hours.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 July 2013	2337	From its position in Ra's Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards buoy No. 3 in the direction of Lebanese territorial waters for 15 seconds.
9 July 2013	0600	On the open sea within the territorial waters of occupied Palestine opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli military launch placed a new buoy next to buoy No. 3 and entered some 10 metres into Lebanese territory. The launch then returned to occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 July 2013	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2115 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They left at 1310 hours over the sea off Tripoli in the direction of Turkey.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1520 over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Zahlah, Riyaq and Baalbek and then over Zahlah, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Al-Arz (the Cedars) before leaving at 0545 on 2 July over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over the sea between Shikka and Tripoli before leaving at 0500 hours on 2 July over the sea off Naqurah.
2 July 2013	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1935 hours over Rumaysh.
	1025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub, the South, Beirut, Ba'abda, Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1355 hours over Rumaysh.
	1140	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1455	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1805 hours over Rumaysh.
	1640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over Bisharri, Batrun, Shikka, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2115 hours over the sea west of Batrun.
	1815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0655 hours on 3 July over Naqurah.
	1825	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2130 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2145	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2255 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2150	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2320 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
3 July 2013	0525	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2125 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1005	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1155 hours over Naqurah.
	1023	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1345 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over Hirmil, Danniyah and Baalbek before leaving at 0730 hours on 4 July over Kafr Killa.
	1445	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1810	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2020 over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 July 2013	0530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1815 hours over Naqurah.
	1045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0015 hours on 5 July over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0015 hours on 5 July over Naqurah.
5 July 2013	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1555 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0813	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0845 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1210	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Juniyah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1340 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0625 hours on 6 July over Kafr Killa.
	1400	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1735	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1930 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	2210	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Sidon. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2315 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 July 2013	0550	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0555	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1245 hours over the sea west of Shikka in the direction of Turkey.
	0850	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1025 hours over Rumaysh.
	1130	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1310 hours over Rumaysh.
	1410	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Tyre heading northwest before leaving at 1445 hours over the sea west of Shikka in the direction of Turkey.
	1505	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over the sea between Jubayl (Byblos) and Shikka before leaving at 1600 hours over Naqurah.
	1605	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1900 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek and then over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0630 hours on 7 July over Rumaysh.
7 July 2013	0520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1500 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and then over the South before leaving at 2315 hours over Rumaysh.
	1810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1410 hours on 8 July over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
8 July 2013	1040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2240 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1410 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2315	Three Israeli enemy helicopters were seen circling over the sea off Tyre, heading south.
9 July 2013	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1435 hours over Naqurah.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1915 hours over Naqurah.
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Hirmil, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 1610 hours over Rumaysh.
10 July 2013	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Danniyah, Hirmil, Al-Arz (the Cedars), Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1440 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1140	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1335 hours over Rumaysh.
	1745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0345 hours on 11 July over Naqurah.
11 July 2013	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering above Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
12 July 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1030 hours on 13 July over Aytarun.
13 July 2013	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Hirmil, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 2135 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Hirmil, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 0920 hours on 14 July over Alma al-Sha'b.
14 July 2013	1045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the area west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Tyre and Naqurah before leaving at 1645 hours over Naqurah.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Danniyah before leaving at 1725 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1435	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1630 hours over Naqurah.
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0450 hours on 15 July over Rumaysh.
15 July 2013	0455	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1220 hours over Naqurah.
	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1825 hours over Rumaysh.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2130 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1240	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1430 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
16 July 2013	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1125	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1335 hours over Alma al-Sha'b
17 July 2013	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2020 hours over Naqurah.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1245 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1505	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1640 hours over Naqurah.
18 July 2013	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1855 hours over Rumaysh.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1440 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2350 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
19 July 2013	0330	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1255 hours over Rumaysh.
21 July 2013	1100	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Rumaysh.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and then between Matn and Riyaq before leaving at 1930 hours over Naqurah.
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Iqlim Al-Kharrub and then the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1350 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
22 July 2013	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah heading north-east. They left at 1035 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1515 hours over Naqurah.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 July 2013	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1305 hours over Naqurah.
	1250	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0635 hours on 24 July over Rumaysh.
24 July 2013	0945	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0030 hours on 25 July over Rumaysh.
25 July 2013	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 1950 hours over Naqurah.
	0955	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 0015 hours on 26 July over Alma al-Sha'b.
27 July 2013	1315	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 July 2013	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Shikka, Tripoli and the sea and then Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1325 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
29 July 2013	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1120 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1430 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1505	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the South before leaving at 1540 hours over Kafr Killa.
30 July 2013	0030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Zahlah and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1905 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Baalbek, Riyaq, Hirmil, Akkar, Danniyah and Tripoli before leaving at 1335 hours over Naqurah.
31 July 2013	0650	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh and leaving at 0705 hours over the sea west of Shikka in the direction of Turkey.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

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Security Council

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English
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Letter dated 2 September 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Honduras to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council and, upon instructions from my Government, to convey to you the official letter dated 2 September 2013 containing the response of the Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a note from El Salvador expressing a protest over acts performed by Honduras in exercising jurisdiction over the Honduran island of Conejo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated to the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Marco A. **Suazo**
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

13-46684 (E) 110913 160913

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Annex to the letter dated 2 September 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Honduras to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/Spanish]
2 September 2013

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of 1 September 2013, in which you express a protest against acts of sovereignty over the island of Conejo performed by the Government of Honduras.

In that connection, it is incumbent upon me to reject your expression of protest. In addition to pointing out that Honduras has exercised sovereignty over the aforementioned island continuously and peacefully since time immemorial, I wish to clarify the following.

1. The island of Conejo was not in dispute before the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the land, island and maritime frontier dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, Nicaragua intervening, as was stated in the judgment of 11 September 1992, paragraph 431, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

> "For the reasons set out in the present Judgment, in particular paragraphs 323 to 368 thereof, the Chamber, by four votes to one, decides that the parties, by requesting the Chamber, in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement of 24 May 1986, 'to determine the legal situation of the islands', have conferred upon the Chamber jurisdiction to determine, as between the parties, the legal situation of all the islands of the Gulf of Fonseca; but that such jurisdiction should only be exercised in respect of those islands which have been shown to be the subject of a dispute."

In the operative part, the Chamber decides that the islands shown to be in dispute between the parties are El Tigre, Meanguera and Meanguerita; that the island of El Tigre is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Honduras; that the island of Meanguera is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of El Salvador; and that the island of Meanguerita is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of El Salvador.

It can easily be concluded from an objective reading of the judgment and the decisions contained therein that at no time was the island of Conejo in dispute.

2. By an application for revision filed with the International Court of Justice, the Government of El Salvador sought indirectly to appropriate the island of Conejo by requesting a revision of the Goascorán sector. The idea behind the application was that, should El Salvador prevail in the revision with a decision by the Court to grant it the Goascorán sector up to the Estero de la Cutú, the island of Conejo would come under the sovereignty of El Salvador because, at a distance of only 600 metres from the coast, it would be inside the three-mile coastal zone.

In its judgment of 18 December 2003, the Court dismissed the Government's application for revision.

3. As befits any State committed to its international obligations and respect for international law, Honduras has accepted and faithfully complied with the judgment handed down by the International Court of Justice on 11 September 1992. Consequently, Honduras has never objected to or expressed a protest against the fact

that the Government of El Salvador performs acts of sovereignty over Meanguera and Meanguerita.

4. The Government of Honduras has rejected the new claims of El Salvador to the island of Conejo and it hereby rejects them once again as unfounded and contrived.

5. We must not fear the full execution of the judicial decisions of competent courts to which we have voluntarily submitted our controversies; rather, we must comply with them fully and without delay. That is one of the most constructive ways possible of contributing to the rule of law and the strengthening of peace and brotherhood.

(*Signed*) Mireya **Agüero de Corrales**
Ambassador
Secretary of State